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ABSTRACT
Today, the business corporation is ubiquitous. Incorporated
according to local and national laws, it exists and functions in an
almost borderless physical and digital space that regulators find
hard to penetrate. As a global actor of enormous economic and
political weight, the corporation is both immersed in and shaped by
borderless financial flows. In response, over the past few decades,
corporate governance has continued to evolve as a complex
assemblage of laws, regulations, guidelines, standards, and
corporate self-regulation. But, given the corporation’s powerful
position in society, corporate governance is no longer perceived to
only concern relationships between managers and investors, but to
also encompass a much wider range of the firm’s stakeholders,
including employees, contractors, suppliers, communities and the
environment. In light of these developments, this Article focuses on
corporate governance as a transnational field of regulatory normproduction, policymaking and political contestation. With the
corporation itself as the key organizational and financial vehicle for
global markets, questions regarding political, democratic
engagement with the corporation continue to produce frustrating
answers. In our Article, we develop an analysis that combines a
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historical, sociological, and political economy investigation into
how the corporation has been governed by law over time. The
research featured in this Article reveals a significant proliferation,
nationally and transnationally, of norm producers in and around the
corporation, offering important insights into the relationship
between markets and political governance, and into the way in
which, going forward, we might rethink existing notions of public
and private authority, accountability, and responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance today is a transnational field of
regulatory norm-production, policymaking, and political
contestation. To begin with, we must ask what follows from the
proposal that corporate governance should today be understood as
a transnational field of regulatory norm-production, policymaking,
and political contestation. More specifically, we must determine the
consequences of our engagement with the political field of corporate
governance, what our environmental responsibilities are, and the
place of corporate law in the democratic nation-state. The
sociological lens we are suggesting in this Article reveals a
fundamentally changed regulatory landscape for corporate
governance today. It constitutes the interplay between both public
and private actors, which include states, a wide range of global
investment funds, multinational corporations, unions, corporate
and public policy think tanks, as well as diverse civil society interest
groups. Despite long-standing attestations to the contrary,1 its key
normative foundations are continuously and, recently, with
increasing intensity, scrutinized and challenged. 2 Today, the
transnational spaces in which the publicly held corporation’s role in
society, its function, and its purpose are being scrutinized, mirror
the cross-border organizational scope of corporations as governance
institutions, lawmakers and wielders of enormous power and
influence.3 In other words, the ongoing and intensifying debates
1 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“There should
be no confusion . . . of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the
stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his
codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders . . . .“); Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 1.
2
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1873 (2017) (“The republic upon which typical Americans depend is
one where the debate is between corporate-manager agents and money-manager
agents, both of whom have different interests than ordinary human investors.”).
3
See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 229, 231
(2015) (“[C]orporations have developed the capacity to negotiate with states to
create norms of international law—norms that bear a particular kind of relationship
of priority to the state party’s domestic legal order.”); Christopher May, Who’s in
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Charge? Corporations as Institutions of Global Governance, PALGRAVE COMMC’NS., Dec.
22, 2015, at 5 (“[C]orporations construct regimes of private law to govern the
relations between the various elements, while also seeking to influence public law
institutions. . . . The use of private law (contract provisions and arbitration
agreements) often utilises public international law as a background justification but
equally is crafted to serve the needs of the particular corporate network in which it
is deployed . . . .”); see also David L. Levy & Rami Kaplan, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Theories of Global Governance: Strategic Contestation in Global Issue
Arenas, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 432, 432-33
(Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the increasing importance of corporate
social responsibility and calls for multinational corporations to use their authority
to establish new governance structures).
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around corporate governance, 4 corporate social responsibility, 5
“corporate stewardship,” 6 and “corporate purpose” 7 illustrate the
4
See Lynn S. Paine & Suraj Srinivasan, A Guide to the Big Ideas and Debates in
Oct.
14,
2019,
at
2,
Corporate
Governance,
HARV. BUS. REV.,
https://hbr.org/2019/10/a-guide-to-the-big-ideas-and-debates-in-corporate-gove
rnance [https://perma.cc/3UQY-J67L] (noting the diversification of corporate
governance debates in light of growing public concern around companies’ roles in
mitigating or accelerating climate change, fighting income inequality, responding
to digitalization, and the rise of populism). For an earlier, comprehensive analysis
of different conceptions of and approaches to corporate governance see Gregory
Jackson & Andreas Moerke, Guest Editorial, Continuity and Change in Corporate
Governance: Comparing Germany and Japan, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 351, 352 (2005)
(comparing the different degrees of adaptation to global financialization in
Germany and Japan’s corporate governance systems), and Thomas Clarke, The
Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance: Theories of Convergence and Variety, 16
EPHEMERA 19, 20-21 (2016) (doubting that the pressure of financial markets will
ultimately result in a global, uniform model of corporate governance). This
contention, of course, has to be viewed against the background of the claim made
by other scholars that such a convergence has already taken place. See, e.g., Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 468 (2001) (arguing that worldwide triumph of the principle of shareholder
value maximization is assured).
5
See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and
Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUM.
RTS. 237, 238 (2015) (analyzing the development of the “Business & Human Rights”
approach in recent years as a response to the “Corporate Social Responsibility”
framework).
6
See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1001-12
(2014) (critically reviewing the UK’s approach to improving corporate stewardship
and accountability through transparency regulation); Dionysia Katelouzou,
Shareholder Stewardship: A Case of (Re)Embedding the Institutional Investors and the
Corporation?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 581 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds.,
2019) (showing how shareholder stewardship is moving from the periphery to the
mainstream of policy making around the world and conflating stewardship with
the concurrent topic of corporate sustainability).
7
See Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P.
Walsh, The Purposes and Accountability of Corporations in Contemporary Society:
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 77 (1999) (“[T]he
purpose of the corporation should continue to be to maximize the value of its
residual claimants—stockholders—within the constraints imposed by law, social
norms, customs, and mores. Furthermore, there is no need to jettison the basic
tenets of the contractarian view of the corporation to achieve this purpose.”). See
also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 177 (2017) (arguing that more should
be done to make corporations assume responsibility for non-shareholder
constituencies); Malcolm S. Salter, Rehabilitating Corporate Purpose: How the Evolution
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degree to which such contentions are not only about the corporation
as a matter of corporate law, but about its actual scope of operation
in a changing socio-economic, cultural, and political environment
and in spaces that are not confined to the borders of nation-states.
As the scope of the corporation’s activities has continued to expand
functionally8 and geographically,9 questions arise as to how law—
and, which law, which authority, and which enforcement regimes—
configures, relates to, and enables the corporation to posture itself
with particular urgency.
We will describe the emerging
configuration of corporate governance regimes that results from
collaboration and competition among public and private actors from
a legal pluralist perspective, which challenges existing, more
traditional, nation-state-oriented understandings of corporate law.
Central to this description is the observation of how corporate
governance norms today contain elements of “hard” and “soft,” or
mandatory and voluntary, rules. As we will show in detail below,
these norms are being introduced, disseminated, revised, and
of Corporate Purpose Has Contributed to a Widening Breach Between Capitalism and
Justice . . . and What to Do About It 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-104,
2019), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/19-104_fcc0a086-d33c4c81-a933-b77fb2eb70f7.pdf [https://perma.cc/D92X-AKQS] (criticizing how the
emphasis on shareholder value has resulted in the immunization of business
corporations from social demands); Paddy Ireland, Corporate Governance,
Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism?, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y
287, 295-306 (1996) (arguing that because the corporation is, in reality, controlled
and its fate decided by financial markets, the idea of a “stakeholder corporation” is
bound to fail).
The company is, and will always be, the personification of
industrial capital and, as such, subject to the imperatives of
profitability and accumulation. These are not imposed from the
outside on an otherwise neutral and directionless entity, but are,
rather, intrinsic to it, lying at the very heart of its existence. No
amount of fiddling with company law – whether it is with the
fiduciary duties of directors or with the structure and
composition of company boards – can change this.
Id. at 304.
8
Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram & Walsh, supra note 7, at 15-28.
9
See John Gerard Ruggie, Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority
and Relative Autonomy, 12 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 317, 318-26 (2018) (mapping
multinational corporations’ scope of global operations and impact on regional
governmental actors); see also Gralf-Peter Calliess, Introduction: Transnational
Corporations Revisited, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 601, 601-02 (2011) (discussing the
growth of transnational corporations and need for further analysis of the scope of
their global economic activities).
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adapted by both public and private actors, who operate within
national legal systems but also through international organizations,
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and private corporate
business institutions.
Instead of taking these observations as a cue to leapfrog into an
abstract or hypothesized “global” understanding, this Article
contends that transnational legal pluralism in corporate governance
must be studied against the background and, in fact, in the context
of continuing state transformation. Our emphasis on both the
transnational and legal pluralist dimensions of corporate
governance today is based on the belief that such regulatory regimes
arise out of state transformation processes that have been occurring
for a number of decades in advanced industrial and post-industrial
societies. At the heart of these processes has been not a retreat of
“the state” per se, but a thoroughgoing differentiation of the state’s
regulatory and institutional architecture towards a higher degree of
privatization (of formerly public responsibilities and services) and
towards a regulatory infrastructure that complements, rather than
replaces, state action with a growing number of private ordering
and “self-regulation” processes in numerous areas of governmental
activity.10 As this Article will show, this shift in political economy
did not merely affect the role played by the state in economic affairs,
but significantly repositioned and repurposed powerful economic
actors themselves, and, above all, the business corporation.11
If, in light of competing political visions for the corporation,
corporate governance raises challenging questions in the domestic
arena, these challenges are exacerbated in the transnational realm.
Seen through a public lawyer’s eyes, almost everything about the
transnationalization of corporate governance appears to raise

10
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343-44 (2004) (“In
all of these contexts, government harnesses the power of new technologies, market
innovation, and civic engagement to enable different stakeholders to contribute to
the project of governance.”); see generally Basak Kus, Neoliberalism, Institutional
Change and the Welfare State: The Case of Britain and France, 47 INT’L. J. COMPAR. SOCIO.
488 (2006) (comparing the different policy responses in Britain and France following
the 1970s oil and financial crisis with the UK opting for a neoliberal stripping of the
state and France reforming state strategies in the pursuit of macroeconomic
efficiency).
11
See infra Part II.
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questions of legitimacy. 12 In other words, who, if not a
democratically elected lawmaker, should create norms that
potentially affect hundreds of thousands of workers and significant
other parts of society? But which, if any, processes are in place today
to ensure adequate societal input into the design of norms, their
enforceability, and their amenability to reform or adaptation?
Where is the norm-creating authority of these largely private actors
located? How must we imagine democratic control of corporate
activity, including the creation of governance norms by corporations
themselves, in the absence of an effective local or global regulator?13
The following analysis intervenes in this debate through three
accounts, which we will unfold in detail after presenting the overall
argument in concentrated form in Part II. The following Parts III
and IV provide an in-depth presentation of the material on which
our argument is based, while Parts V and VI argue for a renewed
political critique of corporate governance. Our first intervention is
a historical one (Part III), our second a sociological one (Part IV), and
our third argument draws on the first two and engages corporate
law and corporate governance as a matter of political critique (Parts
V and VI). Historically, we show how the development of corporate
governance norms, first domestically and then increasingly
transnationally, have been keeping pace with and must be seen in
close connection with particular shifts in the distribution between
public and private actors in carrying out essential social functions in
modern contemporary democracies. While corporations primarily
12
See Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems
of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739,
1745 (2007) (“[A]s economic activity increasingly crossed borders . . . public law, as
either substantive rules or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly
unable to respond efficiently to the problems of the governance of economic
relations.”); Id. at 1747 (“The ability to disperse ownership and operations across
the globe has made it possible for the largest multinational corporations to become
essentially self-regulating . . . the absence of regulation might itself be inefficient, at
least to the extent that it enhances unpredictability and arbitrary conduct . . . .“).
13
See Tim Bartley, Transnational Corporations and Global Governance, 44 ANN.
REV. SOCIO. 145, 155 (2018) (highlighting the increasing importance of private
corporations as “direct providers of global governance”). See also Arthur S. Miller,
The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539,
1550-51 (1960) (addressing “the poverty of constitutional (and political) theory with
respect to the place of the corporation in both the domestic and world economies,
and to suggest that a need exists for the identification of means whereby the
economic power of the large corporation can be tempered ‘in the public interest’”).
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insulate the owners’ assets from liability claims through the creation
of a separate legal entity,14 their larger social and economic role has
long been as an investment vehicle for private placements and, in
complementing the state’s varying protective regimes for old age
security, in building a financial cushion for an ageing workforce.15
Today, corporations assume central and controlling roles in a wide
range of public functions, including the delivery of nearly all
telecommunication services, 16 health care, 17 municipal waste
disposal,18 and they assume leading roles in urban development and
planning, 19 infrastructure financing, 20 and even military warfare
14
See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 27,
https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1896/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5PHUBX] (“[I]f the company was a real company, fulfilling all the requirements of the
Legislature, it must be treated as a company, as an entity, consisting indeed of
certain corporators, but a distinct and independent corporation.”).
15
See generally Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41
UCLA L. REV. 75 (1993) (analyzing the state’s interest in strengthening the private
sector’s and, particularly, the corporation’s role in securing private pension
investments).
16
See Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the
Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395-96 (2004)
(mapping the significant transformation from public to private telecommunications
provision since the 1980s and 1990s).
17 See Dikaios Sakellariou & Elena S. Rotarou, The Effects of Neoliberal Policies
on Access to Healthcare for People with Disabilities, 16 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH, 2017, at
1,
2,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5688676/pdf/12939_2017_Art
icle_699.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TH7-UBCB] (“A series of policy developments –
in the areas of health and labour, mainly – have promoted a neoliberal agenda that
directly affects the lives of people with disability, causing in many cases material
deprivation, insecurity, and stigmatisation.”).
18
See generally Carlo Fanelli, Neoliberal Urbanism and the Assault Against Public
Services and Workers in Toronto, 2006-2011, ARTICULO J. URB. RSCH. (2014),
https://journals.openedition.org/articulo/2380 [https://perma.cc/UN3P-4PVT]
(discussing how Toronto’s pressure on municipal waste workers to agree to lower
wages led to the unionized workers voting for a new austerity and privatization
government).
19
See Eugene J. McCann, Collaborative Visioning or Urban Planning as Therapy?
The Politics of Public-Private Policy Making, 53 PRO. GEOGRAPHER 207, 207 (2001),
http://www.sfu.ca/~emccann/Professional%20Geographer%20Visioning.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7X94-F9R8] (“Planning is increasingly privatized and
decentralized in U.S. cities.”).
20
See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of Public
Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 375, 375-78 (1996) (discussing the rising proliferation but also the risks

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3

2020]

New Geographies of Corporate Governance

61

through extensive sub-contracting arrangements.21 As the range of
corporate activities continues to expand, so does the scope of what
is considered to be part of the regulatory-corporate governance
framework that companies should comply with. This Article charts
these emerging political economies in contemporary corporate law
and corporate governance against the background of three central
(yet increasingly less convincing) themes in the literature’s
continuing corporate governance debate over the past four decades.
From a historical perspective, we recognize a triple fallacy: first, we
take issue with what has turned out to be ultimately inconclusive
and less productive competition between shareholder versus
stakeholder oriented concepts of the firm. Secondly, we revisit the
important work by the “Varieties of Capitalism” school in order to
explore the connections today between specific models of corporate
governance and, specifically, the political economies of corporate
law regulation in different countries. Such polarization is too often
predicated on assumptions of economic efficiency that, in turn,
result in an overdrawn opposition of two competing models of
capitalist
organization
as
demonstrated
by
the
convergence/divergence debate of the 1990s and early 2000s.
While these tensions form an important backdrop of corporate
law’s history, we contend in Part V that this historical account needs
to be complemented by another look at the facts on the ground. It is
in this vein that we review the shareholder/stakeholder conflict and
the attendant attestations regarding convergence and divergence on
the basis of sociological evidence regarding the actual forms,
institutions, and processes of norm production in corporate law
today. While much of the historical story of this conflict and its
trajectories takes a certain institutional regulatory framework of
corporate law for granted, we are skeptical as to the accuracy of this
framework. We show that, rather than courts and governmental
involved in governments’ reliance on private sector financing of public
infrastructures).
21
P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry
and Its Ramifications for International Security, 26 INT’L SEC. 186, 186 (2001) (“PMFs
[private military firms] are profit-driven organizations that trade in professional
services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate bodies that specialize in
the provision of military skills—including tactical combat operations, strategic
planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training,
and military technical assistance.”).
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departments acting as the exclusive corporate lawmakers or
initiators of corporate governance norms, it is a wealth of non-state
actors, such as institutional investors, expert committees, various
financial actors, consultancies, business corporations as well as
sector-specific and other civil society associations such as the
“Business Roundtable,”22 who are engaged in forging new corporate
governance standards. Based on this evidence, we contend that
corporate governance can no longer be described only against the
background of a nation-state-based political economy and its system
of judicial and legislative lawmaking. Corporate governance, by
contrast, illustrates a high degree of regulatory differentiation that
is displayed across a range of different law-creating actors and
institutions and manifests itself across a range of regulatory
instruments from statutes to court decisions, recommendations to
best practice guidelines, and codes of conduct. Just as these
institutions include public and private actors, as well as domestic
and international actors, the type of norms that these actors generate
encompasses different degrees of “hard” and “soft” law, which are
generated through a variety of different lawmaking processes.
From this sociological perspective, these emerging constellations
of actors, norms, and processes represent what can most adequately
be called “transnational legal pluralism,” which we place at the
heart of our political economy analysis of what corporate
governance is today and in whose hands and in which places it is
being shaped. 23 The legal pluralist concept of transnational
corporate governance describes and captures the field’s hybrid,
mixed, and “in-between” nature, but avoids the risk of
overstatement in terms of either characterizing these arrangements
as non-legal or giving them the misleading label of “global law.” As
for the former, the transnational legal pluralism of corporate
governance is constituted by an overlapping and co-existence of
hard and soft, formal and informal, legal arrangements rather than
by a neat choice between them. It is therefore more accurate to refer
to transnational regulatory arrangements as those that are created
by actors that cut across jurisdictional boundaries but also include a
mix of public and private institutions than to associate them with a
22
BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE,
[https://perma.cc/HE4T-ZBX4].
23 See infra Parts V, VI.
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“global law” forum and a complementing global institutional
infrastructure without explaining more specifically where this
infrastructure is located, how it is created, and, furthermore, how it
enforces global law.
This evolution of transnational corporate governance
arrangements prompts, in our view, the need to rethink the
correlation between law creation and political economy. This has
two important components. On the one hand, our interest in
scrutinizing law’s relationship to the political economy to which it
contributes and belongs echoes similar recent calls among critical
legal scholars to interrogate the role of law in a political economy,24
which is marked by high degrees of legal, socio-economic, racial,
and gender inequality. This prompts a detailed analysis of how law
contributes to the perpetuation of these inequalities.25 We argue that
corporate governance is not merely concerned with the regulation
of investor-management relations. Rather, it functions, in reality, as
a much-contested regulatory forum in which the role of the
corporation in society and towards its various stakeholders is
scrutinized and negotiated. A political economy analysis of
corporate governance can thus help to unpack the separation of the
firm as an economic actor, as part of “the market,” and of corporate
law as belonging to the legal and regulatory system when we ask
how corporate law shapes and facilitates and is in turn shaped by
the business corporation as it performs its different societal
functions. By treating the corporation not as an abstract economic
24
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2014) (“The questions that neoliberalism addresses at
the deepest level, then, are not How much market?, or How much governance?, but
Which interests will enjoy protection, whether as property rights, constitutional
immunities, or objects of special regulatory solicitude, and which others will be left
vulnerable or neglected? Unavoidably, these are contests over the distribution of
economic claims and privileges and even of market discipline itself.”).
25
See, e.g., KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND
THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019)
(investigating the effects on racial inequality by the 1960s federal housing initiatives
to promote single-family ownership in Black communities); Priya S. Gupta,
Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 18895 (2015) (showing how the facilitation of black homeownership through bank
loans and federal regulation resulted in deepened neighborhood segregation and
racial discrimination). For an analysis of attempts by white individuals to derive
commercial value from including black people in their employee or customer base,
see generally Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).
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actor, but in the concrete context of changing societal expectations
towards it, the reciprocal effects between law and the corporation
become more clearly recognizable. 26 Corporate governance can
again be seen in relation to a larger, encompassing debate around
the corporation’s place in society, 27 and its corresponding social
responsibilities.28
The analysis in Parts V and VI of this Article aims at recognizing
the degree to which the actual space of corporate governance
regulation has been expanding beyond the institutional and
jurisdictional boundaries of the state. Institutionally, corporate
governance is cared for today not just by ministries, parliaments,
and courts, but by a public/private assemblage of governmental
departments, expert committees, and working groups, as well as
stock exchanges, banks, institutional investors, and companies’ legal
departments. 29 Meanwhile, geographically, the representation of
political economy as an integrated system of political and legal
governance grounded in the nation-state, which still provided the
26
See, e.g., Dana L. Brown, Antje Vetterlein & Anne Roemer-Mahler,
Theorizing Transnational Corporations as Social Actors: An Analysis of Corporate
Motivations, BUS. & POLS., Jan. 2010, at 1 (investigating corporate decisions to
commit to social and environmental goals in response to changing societal
expectations).
27
See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
(1954) (providing a landmark account of the political significance of large American
corporations and their influence on American society).
28
See generally Ruth V. Aguilera, Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley &
Deborah E. Rupp, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative
Analysis of the UK and the US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE & SOC. RESP. 147 (2006)
(highlighting the different national approaches to improve corporate law to make
it more responsive to social concerns).
29
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 873-83 (1992)
(mapping the different public and private interest group interventions in the
creation of the American Law Institute and the ongoing reform of the ALI
Principles); CARY COGLIANESE, THOMAS J. HEALEY, ELIZABETH K. KEATING & MICHAEL
L. MICHAEL, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6-8 (2004),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2610009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SDB8-XECB] (debating the tensions between “regulation” by
government and “self-regulation” by market actors in the area of corporate
governance standard setting); Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise
of Efficient Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007) (analyzing Wal-Mart’s self-regulatory activities across a
variety of issues pertaining to workplace safety, employee relations, and company
policy).
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basis for “international political economy,”30 (IPE) has today given
way to shifting transnational assemblages of regulatory regimes
that, because they are made up of both public and private, and
domestic and international, actors, do not neatly fit into the
traditional political economy mold.31 These new constellations give
rise to what we argue should be considered a multiplication and
proliferation of transnational political economies of governance.
This recognition of a transnationalization of political economy is not
new, nor is our interest in the multilevel order of different types of
regulators distinct.32 In arguing for the need to embrace the hybrid
transnational nature of governance today, we both build on and
extend the emerging work in political science, international
relations, and critical international political economy. But, by
shifting our focus onto corporate governance specifically, we
contribute an important area of analysis, especially as, so often,
corporate governance is reduced to a site of conflict between
shareholders and stakeholders. Our transnational political economy
analysis shows that, in reality, corporate governance is a much more
complex arena of competing concerns regarding the protection of
30
See Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, State, Market, and Global Political Economy:
Genealogy of an (Inter-?) Discipline, 76 INT’L. AFFS. 805 passim (2000) (tracing how the
newly emerging discipline of “international political economy” resulted in a
context of globalizing economic relations and the perceived need of an analytical
toolkit to move beyond nation-state grounded political economy understandings in
order to study the international interactions between states).
31
See Jean-Christophe Graz, Hybrids and Regulation in the Global Political
Economy, 10 COMPETITION & CHANGE 230, 231 (2006) (“The role of non-state actors is
a key issue; they cooperate across borders to establish rules and standards widely
accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in their definition. Despite a fast
growing body of scholarship on non-state actors in the global context, there is no
clear definition of the relationship between those defining, implementing,
recognising and monitoring these rules and those complying with them – global
firms, capital markets, states, various non-state actors and, more generally,
citizens.”).
32
See Jarrod Wiener, The “Transnational” Political Economy: A Framework for
MERCATORIA
1-3
(1996),
Analysis,
LEX
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/the.transnational.political.economy.a.framework.for
.analysis.jarrod.wiener.ukc/portrait.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2MP-TR5H]
(introducing the concept of transnational political economy in response to a surge
in “globalisation” studies still too much focused on the role of the state); see also A.
CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (arguing that a powerful
transnational corporate elite is able to set their rules of engagement without
effective control or intervention by the government).
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different interests in highly volatile economic contexts. From our
perspective, then, corporate governance is embedded in a larger
framework of critical analysis with regard to the complex political
economies that, today, make up corporate governance regulation. In
that vein, we challenge the prevailing idea of neatly distinguishing
between state-made/hard/binding law and non-state/soft/nonbinding law, given how transnational corporate governance is
characterized by an interpenetration and co-existence of these
different types and forms of norms. Corporate governance allows
us to scrutinize contemporary market governance arrangements as
a political project and, from a historical and sociological perspective,
opens up to an investigation of the differently emerging types of
norms and processes without trying to qualify these as strictly
“public” or “private,” or by drawing a line between “hard” and
“soft” law.
II. THE ARGUMENT
In order to unpack the significance of the transnationalization of
corporate governance as a transnational field of regulatory normproduction, policymaking, and political contestation, we advance
three arguments: a historical one, a sociological one, and a political
economy one. Historically, we argue that the evolution of corporate
governance norms must be seen against the background of ongoing
and continuing transformations in the relationships between states
and markets in the provision of a growing range of formerly
“public” services and functions. 33 As the societal role of
corporations expands beyond an essentially financial role, corporate
governance norm production mirrors the diversification of
regulatory concerns associated with the firm’s place in society.
From a sociological perspective, we argue that the
transnationalization of present-day corporate governance regimes
constitutes not so much a categorically different state of corporate
law in an age of “globalization,” but a continuation of corporate
law’s inherent legal pluralism in terms of coexisting public and
private, hard and soft, and formal and informal norms.34 The legal
33
34

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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pluralist concept of transnational corporate governance describes
and captures the field’s hybrid, mixed, and “in-between” nature but
avoids the risk of overstatement in terms of either characterizing
these arrangements as non-legal or giving them the misleading label
of “global law.” Our analysis draws attention to the pre-existing
instability and unsettledness of regulatory norms in areas such as
corporate law, securities regulation, labor law, or social protection.
Legal sociologists have long been emphasizing the prevailing legal
pluralist nature of regulatory governance in fields where public and
private, formal and informal, “hard” and “soft” norms not only exist
side by side, but, in fact, complement one another by addressing
different aspects of social or institutional behavior. Today’s
diversified and cross-border nature, transnational constitution of
corporate governance norm-production is not an anomaly of lawmaking, but a further step in the evolution of legal norms in
politically sensitive and continuously changing contexts. By
reviewing the development of corporate governance regimes as a
particular form of regulatory governance “in context,” we argue that
the transnational constellations of actors, norms, and processes that
constitute today’s corporate governance regulation produce new
and overlapping political economies. No longer confined to the
regulatory prerogative of a domestic lawmaker or regulator but also
not (yet) having been reclaimed by an international financial
regulator with global governance authority, corporate governance
rules, today, appear, instead, as being negotiated, shaped, and
disseminated, as well as “hardened,” through the interplay of major
market players and supranational institutions, in relation to whom
states have increasingly assumed the role of mediators or mere
facilitators. In our analysis, we show how transnational regulatory
arrangements are created by both governmental and nongovernmental institutions that act across jurisdictional boundaries.
As we focus on the organizations and actors engaged in contesting,
creating, and disseminating corporate governance norms today, we
reject the idea of an abstract notion of “global law” and of a
complementing, global institutional infrastructure. We apply a
socio-legal lens to show, more specifically, where this infrastructure
is located and how it creates and enforces these newly emerging
forms of transnational corporate governance law.
Finally, our political economy argument posits that corporate
governance is not merely concerned with the regulation of investor-
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management relations but functions, in reality, as a much-contested
regulatory forum in which the role of the corporation in society and
towards its various stakeholders is being scrutinized and
negotiated.35 A political economy analysis of corporate governance
can thus help to unpack the separation of the firm as an economic
actor, as part of “the market,” and of corporate law as belonging to
the legal and regulatory system when we ask how corporate law
both shapes and facilities and is in turn shaped by the business
corporation as it performs its different societal functions. Building
on the insights of Varieties of Capitalism (“VoC”) scholars who
distinguish between so-called “coordinated” and “liberal” market
economies and on the work in comparative financial regulation,36
we argue that today’s proliferation of public, private, and hybrid
processes of corporate governance norm production requires an
even more differentiated view on the relationship between states
and local, regional, and global markets. It is ultimately, from a
pluralized political economy perspective on corporate law that we
propose a reconceptualization of corporate law and, in particular, of
corporate governance as a transnational field, which can no longer
adequately be depicted through the categories that previously
applied to corporate law as a domestic law and policy concern.
Our historical, sociological, and political economy approach to
the study of the transnationalization of corporate governance feeds
into a political analysis of who, actually, calls the shots in this
transnationally fragmented regulatory space. As we map the
interactions between public and private actors, it becomes more
evident how they operate in part in a pluralistic world, which is not
exclusively centered in national political and legal orders but
continues to push and exist and proliferate beyond them. At the
same time, national corporate governance regulation is being
transformed on the inside, above all, by the forces of global financial

See infra Parts V and VI.
See, e.g., Colin Mayer, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review
of the International Evidence, 154 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 144 (1998) (providing
an overview of a surge in the 1990s of scholarly analysis of the correlation between
financial regulation and corporate governance in countries including the United
States, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, as well as Asia).
35
36
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markets. 37 From this perspective, the proposal of a concept of
transnational corporate governance has two key consequences. On the
one hand, it challenges the “end of history” claims regarding the
inevitability of a worldwide convergence of corporate governance
systems towards a singularly triumphant norm of shareholder value
maximization,38 while, on the other, it pushes back against the idea
of regulatory competition among different governments in pursuit
of the most attractive and effective corporate governance system.
With its origin in the United States’ system of competing regulatory
charter states,39 the idea of regulatory competition gained renewed
prominence during the years of heated debate over the proposed
European Takeover Directive, which pitted competing views of
different EU member states against one another.40 In contrast, our
focus on the transnational legal pluralism of corporate governance
today goes beyond an analysis that largely remains focused on state
actors as we direct attention to the much messier landscape of public
and private “norm entrepreneurs” who are acting nationally and
transnationally. We question the explanatory value of assertions
regarding convergence and divergence as well as regulatory
competition, because both are still too moored in a regulatory
system presumably governed by state actors. In turn, we want to
draw attention to the particular nature and dimension of the
political challenges that arise from the distinctly transnational, hybrid
37
See Mary O’Sullivan, The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate
Governance, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 23 passim (2003) (showing how even countries
such as Germany and France have been adapting their national corporate
governance systems in the hope of making their companies gain access to global
capital investments).
38
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 439 (“There is no longer any
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to
increase long-term shareholder value.”).
39
See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (discussing states use of regulation to compete for
incorporation of companies); see also Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate
in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987) (“[S]tates compete to provide
firms with . . . corporate charters, in order to obtain franchise tax revenues.”).
40
Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142/12). For a discussion of the different
position in the debate, see John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC
Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
54,
2005),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id860
444.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XTE-LAC2].
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formation processes of corporate governance in globalized financial
markets, characterized by the interplay of governments,
institutional investors, but also unions, labor, and community as
well as environmental activists. This makes our proposal a crucial
political intervention as well.
By showing how corporate
governance norms are actually generated, administered, and
implemented through a complex and transnationally spatialized
interaction between financial, state, and civil society actors, we
challenge the narrative of an “enabling” corporate law according to
which corporate law almost miraculously emerges through market
innovation and a more or less hands-off attitude on the side of courts
and governments.41 By asking more specifically which elements in
corporate law and corporate governance get regulated and by
whom, we begin to see transnational corporate governance as a
space for political contestation, intervention, and reform. Our focus
on such a space as a site of contestation and engagement continues a
critical engagement with long-standing ideas and assumptions
regarding the separation of state and society and distinctions
between the political and non-political, rather than simply refuting
them. The significance of a separation of state and society and its
accompanying distinction between a “public” and a “private”
sphere, associated with which are respective denotations as political
and non-political, for corporate law can hardly be overstated. With
the corporation constituting the linchpin, backbone, and engine of
the economy, it is a key battlefield in the negotiation of social power,
state governance and an all-consuming economic rationality.
In our conceptualization of corporate governance as an
instantiation of
transnational legal pluralism, we build on
important work, which connects corporate law theory with a focus
on both national and transnational political economy contexts. 42
41
See Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 599, 601-02 (1965) (setting out four features of “enabling” corporate
law); see also John C. Coffee Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623-24 (1989) (challenging the
idea of unlimited contractual “innovation”).
42
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its
Political Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
56 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT
(2003) (providing an important comparative law analysis in corporate governance
regulation).
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While our approach importantly draws on VoC analysis of how
historically evolving political economies form the key context and
background for the regulation of economic activities—of which
corporate governance is a part—we are going beyond the
institutional analysis provided by the VoC scholars in order to shed
more light on the emergence of private and self-regulatory regimes
in corporate governance against the background of the state
transformation that marks the fate of modern nation states in the
global era.43
A project of transnational corporate governance that takes its
cues from history, sociology, and political economy is, furthermore,
outright political, because it resists the lure of simplifying,
ideological oppositional dualisms. As has already become clear, a
key dualism in corporate governance debates has been, and
continues to be, that between shareholders and stakeholders. We
are critical of how well the juxtaposition of these two, allegedly
distinct, groups can actually explain the politics of the modern
business corporation. To us, the distinction between a shareholder
and a stakeholder approach to corporate governance eludes the
actual diversity of interests in, and expectations of, the corporation.
While its binary simplicity lends itself to persuasive rhetoric, as in
the form of the already mentioned “end of history”44 claims, or the
recurring idea of a “global market for corporate law,” 45 the
juxtaposition effectively invisibilizes the scope of power that
companies hold over communities and very differently situated and
positioned interest holders. It, furthermore, not only avoids a closer
scrutiny of the competing forces that lay claim to the corporation
and its role in society, but it also keeps out of view the complex
political economy changes that impact the socio-economic and
political real-world environment in which corporations exist.

43
See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 229, 230 (2012) (explaining how domestic state transformation must be
studied in relation to the changes in global markets and global political
developments).
44
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4 (arguing that shareholder value
maximization has emerged as the globally triumphant organizing principle for the
modern stock corporation).
45
ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 1 (2009) (arguing
that parties, including individuals and corporations, can “shop for the law”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

72

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

While the resistance against the shareholder/stakeholder
dualism is a crucial element in our substantive critique, it is also
directly connected to our emphasis on the transnationalization of
corporate governance. By that we mean that a closer analysis of the
transnational actors, norms, and processes in corporate governance
renders visible the complex constituencies of corporations today
and can thus help to recognize a much more differentiated variety
of forces that impact the corporation and how it is governed. A
transnational legal pluralist approach to corporate governance then
engages, but is not limited to, the domestic space as a still important
forum for corporate governance creation. 46 It resists drawing
categorical lines between the national, the supranational, and the
international spheres of norm creation and instead acknowledges
the specific processes of norm creation that occur among and
through public and private actors within, as well as across, those
boundaries.47 As such, it resists the normative consequentiality of
the dominant narrative, which emphasizes the restrained role that
governments should play in “regulating” corporate behavior per se
while embracing the idea that restraint will eventually result in a
perfect regulatory regime for corporations on a global scale. The
blindspot of this narrative remains the actually much wider political
debate about the role that corporations play in modern societies.
This debate touches on the immense impact of corporations on
employment, social security, the environment, and, increasingly,
privacy,48 and that oftentimes seems to be going on in considerable
distance from the specialized corporate law circles. 49 But,
46
O’Sullivan, supra note 37, at 25 (“To emphasize the importance of economic
forces is not to say that the political dimensions of the transformation of systems of
corporate governance are unimportant.”).
47
See Julia Black & David Rouch, Special Feature, The Development of the Global
Markets as Rule- Makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 218 passim
(2008) (considering the role of markets in the normative rule-making process).
48
For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the challenges posed by the
digital technology and the quest by powerful corporations to predict and control
behavioral patterns, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
49
See, e.g., David Vogel, Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A
Dissent from the New Conventional Wisdom, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 385 (1987); Barbara
Fryzel, Governance of Corporate Power Networks, FIN. & COMMON GOOD, 2005, at 28,
28; Geert de Neve, Power, Inequality and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Politics of
Ethical Compliance in the South Indian Garment Industry, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 30,
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financialization has not only transformed the corporation and
corporate law.50 At a time when consumption patterns have become
insulated from climatical or geographical facilities and where global
exchange, extraction, and sale of data fuels 24/7 availability,
informed and willing consumers and corporations hold significant
power.
Meanwhile, the regulatory theories that focus on
corporations and their internal and external relations are lagging
behind.
From this follows our central argument, which concerns the
emergence of a different, pluralistic political economy of
transnational corporate governance. In light of a legal pluralist
understanding of corporate governance norm production today, the
related institutions of norm production, adjudication, and
enforcement are taking on new forms. Legal institutions, like law
itself, do not exist in the abstract and ephemeral, but in concrete
social contexts. It is from them that they receive affirmation or
rejection, impulses for change or continuity. Legal doctrine, in
corporate law and beyond, is a child of time, and as such must be
understood in the context in which it is relied upon. As we show in
our analysis in Part V, this context for corporate law production has
been undergoing significant changes with privatization and
globalization driving a fundamental reconfiguration of traditional
architectures of public lawmaking and administration. As corporate
governance codes, codes of conduct, and other best practice
standards become more and more woven into the regulatory/selfregulatory fabric of what constitutes corporate law around the
world today, legal doctrine is quickly adapting to these new
formations. As codes formulate new modes of accountability,
transparency, and compliance, doctrinal assessments of corporate
and directors’ liability or a company’s and its investors’ reporting

2009, at 63, 63; George Monbiot, Taming Corporate Power: The Key Political Issue of our
Age,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
8,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/08/taming-corporatepower-key-political-issue-alternative [https://perma.cc/LAS2-5MAT]; Nicholas
Connolly & Manette Kaisershot, Corporate Power and Human Rights, 19 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 663 (2015).
50
See Laura Horn, The Financialization of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION:
A CRITICAL, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 281, 281 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer
eds., 2017); see also Costas Lapavitsas, The Financialization of Capitalism: ‘Profiting
Without Producing’, 17 CITY 792 (2013).
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obligations change. 51 These adaptations are neither born out of
essentialist assertions of legal causality and responsibility nor do
they neatly adhere to law and economics principles underlying the
“nature of the firm”: instead, the new legal doctrines of corporate
governance incorporate these continuously evolving standards but
evaluate, assess and shape them in light of the changing sociological
constellations that constitute the regulatory universe of corporate
governance today.
In order to further explicate the particular dynamics that
characterize the transnational emergence of corporate governance
norms today, we discuss, in Part VII, the evolving law of
shareholder stewardship as a case-in-point.
We trace the
shareholder stewardship movement from its beginnings with
internalized self-regulatory processes, which translated into the
“soft” UK Stewardship Code and other similar codes across various
countries, forward to the time of the amended EU Shareholder
Rights Directive (SRD II).52 We posit that shareholder stewardship,
even though it started as a case of enrolling institutional
shareholders in corporate governance regulation via soft, marketinvoking law based on conventional law and economics
assumptions, became increasingly hardened and brought a public
coloration into shareholder engagement and investment
management integrating sustainability concerns. At the same time,
the adoption of stewardship codes across nineteen countries, the
SRD II, and the development of supporting stewardship principles
and codes of conduct by regional and international investor
associations show that the national, regional, and international
policy space is currently much more perplexed.
51
See Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG
Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734 (2019) (“Financial analysts increasingly
consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in rating
companies . . . . The complication for a fiduciary is that these factors may also
reflect benefits or costs beyond a company’s financial bottom line.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Frederick Alexander, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations:
Widening the Fiduciary Aperture to Broaden the Corporate Mission, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Spring 2016, at 66; Frederick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit
Corporations,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
(July
20,
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/07
/05_alexander/ [https://perma.cc/B4VE-L75R].
52
Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of
Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132/1) [hereinafter SRD II].
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Our analysis intervenes at a particular intersection. On one side
lies the political challenge to the contemporary corporate
governance model, which remains tied to a triple fallacy. The first
is a vain competition between shareholder-versus-stakeholderoriented concepts of the firm, the second a polarization between
monolithic national models of corporate governance, and the third
a binary distinction between state-made/hard/binding law and
non-state/soft/non-binding law.
On the other side of this
intersection we find, in an institutional sense, the increasing
proliferation of non-state made corporate governance rules
generated by private actors, including institutional investors,
corporations, and specialized expert committees. We argue that the
resulting pluralization of corporate governance political economies
today can only be scrutinized through a more differentiated,
analytical lens that focuses on the emerging actors, norms, and
processes that constitute the intersecting and overlapping
transnational regimes of corporate governance today. This shift in
perspective has important repercussions for the forward-going
engagement with corporate governance. Instead of being a battle
ground for what is often presented as being two irreconcilable sets
of interests—shareholders and stakeholders—a socio-legal analysis
of how corporate governance norms are created and disseminated,
the complex regulatory, transnational regime of corporate
governance production becomes a methodological laboratory in
itself. As such, it allows us to situate and contextualize corporate
governance as part of a critical inquiry into emerging forms of
authority and legitimacy of market regulation. By approaching
corporate governance both as a transnational regulatory landscape
that brings together public and private actors in a struggle over
regulatory authority and as a normative field of political conflict and
contestation, an engagement with corporate governance becomes an
opportunity to connect sector-specific debates with larger questions
of democratic market governance. In trying to better understand
what is and who drives corporate governance rules today, we
scrutinize competing assertions of authority and legitimate
authorship and claims of accountability and impact.
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III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
It is our contention that an analysis of transnational corporate
governance must pay close attention to the changes that have been
underway within advanced nation-states since the 1970s. During
that time, the world saw the end of the Bretton-Woods system of
currency exchange rates pegged to the U.S. dollar and to the price of
gold and a rising global competitiveness among states to provide
attractive investment destinations while, at the same time, achieve a
reduction in public expenditures.53 While this background is crucial
for an understanding of the corporation and its law, we argue that
there must be more emphasis placed on the concrete, in-context
analysis of corporations and of the legal regimes that address and
empower them. This focus on context and, in particular, on the
historically evolved environment of the nation state where a
corporation is headquartered is a prerequisite for a more adequate
appreciation of the different forces that push and pull on the
corporation as an object of regulation. It is also an important aspect
of present-day corporate governance analysis. We think that even
where such analysis takes into account the historical and
institutional variations across different countries and their legal
cultures with regard to how labor and corporate governance
systems are complementing each other as a result of normative,

53

The collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary and financial system was
followed by loosened domestic regulations on finance and financial
institutions, giving rise to a wave of financial innovations, especially
in the U.S. and U.K., as both countries aspired to nurture their
financial sectors. The introduction of new market players, such as
pension and mutual funds, expanded, deepened, and increased the
attractive power of financial markets, so that (for example) borrowing
money by selling bonds began to replace traditional bank loans. In
order to attract investment and/or loans, or, somewhat later on, to
satisfy conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), now repurposed as an instrument of neoliberal “structural
adjustment”, [sic] developed and developing countries alike had to
liberalize their own financial markets.
Glenn Fieldman, Finance Unchained: The Political Economy of Unsustainability,
SUSTAINABILITY, Mar. 24, 2020, at 1, 2 (footnotes omitted).
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political choices,54 we must still develop a sharper analytical lens for
the transnational variety of public and private, and domestic and
international actors that are now shaping corporate governance
norms.55
This need follows from the ongoing diversification of actors,
norms, and processes in the area of corporate governance, a sectorspecific development that mirrors analogous trends in other
regulatory areas today.56 The institutional and normative variety of
corporate governance today suggests that it does not simply
represent a regulatory object or the outcome of a political decision
for or against something. Instead, corporate governance today is a
veritable arena for competing visions of market regulation, and as
such, the notions of “market” and “regulation” are both under
political scrutiny rather than merely being two elements in a causeeffect equation. Markets are, by default, integrative, expansive, and
potentially infinite,57 making the question about law’s relationship
54
See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance,
and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? 41 L. & SOC. REV. 865, 871
(2007) (“[T]he timing of industrialization, the structure of firms and of labor unions,
the degree of liquidity of capital markets, and more generally the role of the state
in regulating economic life, are among the many factors which might be expected
to influence the evolution of distinctive legal ‘varieties of capitalism.’”).
55
See Tim Bartley, Transnational Corporations and Global Governance, 44 ANN.
REV. SOCIO. 145, 155-57 (2018) (mapping transnational corporations’ self-regulation
in various areas where governmental regulation is absent); see also Peer Zumbansen,
Neither ‘Public’ Nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ Nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate
Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 50 (2011) (highlighting
different examples of the state’s interaction with market actors in creating corporate
governance norms).
56
See, e.g., Lobel, supra, note 10; Robert Falkner, Private Environmental
Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links, GLOB. ENV’T POL., May
2003, at 72 (discussing the growing significance of corporate actors in devising
environmental regulatory instruments); Doris Fuchs & Agni Kalfagianni, The
Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance, BUS. & POL., Oct 2010, at 1 passim
(2010) (offering a critical assessment of the rise in importance and influence of
private actors controlling the production and accessibility of food stuffs); John
Biggins & Colin Scott, Licensing the Gatekeeper? Public Pathways, Social Significance
and the ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, 6 TRANSNAT’L. LEGAL
THEORY 370 (2015) (mapping the interpenetration of public and private authority in
licensing credit derivatives).
57
See, e.g., Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., MayJune 1983, at 92, https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets
[https://perma.cc/K3FQ-CRA7] (“[There is a] new commercial reality—the
emergence of global markets for standardized consumer products on a previously
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to and in markets a complex challenge. Given the differences
between particular markets and between various ways in which law
is used to create obstacles, facilitate activities, or impose rules for
product quality or information transparency, 58 terms such as
“regulation” or “intervention” do not adequately describe this
relationship, nor can they be expected to effectively capture the
shortcomings of different regulatory forms. 59
While the
differentiation of regulatory processes into “mandatory” or
“voluntary” or “optional” mirrors the challenges of addressing
historically embedded institutional differences while effectively
responding to different companies’ abilities to adapt to changing
regulatory demands,60 a more in-depth analysis of the transnational
sociology of public and private regulatory governance is still
outstanding. Corporate governance, in our view, offers a promising
example of such an analysis, not least because of the wealth of
research that continues to be done in this area. Corporate
governance as a “field” of investigation, policymaking, and law
reform, but also one of public contestation and critical political
debate, cuts across the theory-practice divide and engages
unimagined scale of magnitude. Corporations geared to this new reality benefit from
enormous economies of scale in production, distribution, marketing, and
management.”).
58
See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201-03 (1999) (highlighting a
variety of non-financial disclosures of a company’s activities, places of operation,
and impact); Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate
Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 57-60 (2009)
(explaining the shift from direct intervention and regulation to models of
“reflexive” governance in making companies create more transparency); Dan S.
Dhaliwal, Oliver Zhen Li, Albert Tsang & Yong George Yang, Voluntary
Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting, ACCT. REV., Jan. 2011, at 59, 62-63 (arguing that firms pursue
non-financial (“social”) reporting in the hope of reducing the cost of attracting
equity capital).
59
See David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial Disclosure and the
Responsibility of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5, 7 (2019) (listing
the reasons why regulators continue to invest in transparency regulation despite
known shortcomings).
60
See Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, Optional Rather than Mandatory
EU Company Law Framework and Specific Proposals 1 (European Corp. Governance
78,
2007),
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id958
247.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QR-XE3E] (proposing optional regulations which
will benefit small and medium size enterprises and will allow for more flexibility).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3

2020]

New Geographies of Corporate Governance

79

regulators, scholars, and civil society actors simultaneously. As
these debates are no longer confined to national political economies,
the strategies that are being discussed reach beyond the legal
confines of “corporate law” in country A or country B. Instead,
corporate governance becomes a transnational regulatory concern,
highlighting the need to understand the historical, legal, and sociocultural arguments, on which calls for different types of corporate
governance regulation are being formulated.61 With that, however,
arises the need to better understand the historically evolved
institutional varieties of corporate governance regulation that we
have now come to witness in their adaptation to globalizing
financial markets.62
This Article intervenes at a critical juncture. We think this
juncture is constituted, on the one hand, by a revitalized and
burgeoning debate around the social and political significance of the
corporation in society and, on the other, by a continuing disconnect
between concepts of corporate law associated with the nation-state
and the sociological reality of transnational spaces in which the
corporation actually operates. The background for this disconnect
can be illuminated by contrasting the traditional political economy
analysis of corporate law as grounded in the nation-state with a host
of emerging sociological studies of transnational governance forms,
of which we believe corporate governance is a powerful illustration.
An effective intervention in this constellation, in our view, will
depend on the degree to which we can show that the political
economy of national corporate law should be made part of a larger
political economy analysis of neoliberal state transformation since
the late 1970s. It is since that time that the private business
61
One of the present authors has investigated this angle in the context of
European Company Law Regulation. See Peer Zumbansen, ‘New Governance’ in
European Corporate Law Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism, 15 EUR. L.J. 246,
271 (2009) (pointing to the insights from the Varieties of Capitalism analysis in
employment, corporate and social welfare law in different EU member states
regarding the “embeddedness of regulatory regimes in historically grown cultural,
political and economic institutions”).
62
See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Anthony
Gould, Michael Barry & Adrian Wilkinson, Varieties of Capitalism Revisited: Current
Debates and Possible Directions, 70 INDUS. RELS. 587 (2015) (analyzing both the
influence and critique of Hall’s and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism approach).
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corporation has increasingly stepped into the shoes of the state in
providing key public infrastructure support and delivery across a
range of formerly or allegedly “public” services. 63 With the
corporation’s changing role as a societal actor, however, its legal
status has become ever more ambiguous. While corporate law
conceives of the corporation as a private entity that comes into being
through the surprising, perhaps improbable, combination of
contractual agreements between investors and managers64 and its
legal recognition as a “separate legal entity,”65 we will still need to
unpack this paradox as we simultaneously work towards a concept
of corporate law that can fully and adequately capture the reality of
the corporation as a powerful societal actor.66

63
See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative
Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (2000) (“Contemporary regulation might be best
described as a regime of ‘mixed administration’ in which private actors and
government share regulatory roles. In fact, many private actors participate in
governance in ways that are rarely recognized by the public, acknowledged by
politicians, or carefully analyzed by legal scholars. Private individuals, private
firms, financial institutions, public interest organizations, domestic and
international standard-setting bodies, professional associations, labor unions,
business networks, advisory boards, expert panels, self-regulating organizations,
and non-profit groups all help to perform many of the regulatory functions that, at
least in legal theory, we assume agencies perform alone.” (footnotes omitted)).
64
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976)
(describing the relationship between owners and managers as one of “pure
agency”).
65
Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Separate Legal Entity, 31 MOD. L. REV.
481, 481 (1968) (“Under English company law the company is a separate legal entity.
Yet, although this is a fundamental concept, it has proved extremely intractable to
define and to describe satisfactorily.”).
66
See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne, “Can You Hear Me Now . . .
Good!” Feminism(s), the Public/Private Divide, and Citizens United v. FEC, 20 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 40 (2013) (“[A]s feminists sought to challenge the public/private
distinction by making the private more public, corporations (representing the
hierarchical, male-dominated private sector that feminists were opposing) were
also resisting the divide between public and private, but with a pernicious intent.
Through lobbying, campaign contributions, sheer economic power, and most
recently, by a largely unsolicited boost from the United States Supreme Court in
Citizens United v. FEC, corporations have worked to privatize much of the public
sphere—up to and including the electoral process in the United States.”); see also I.
MAURICE WORMSER, Corporate Ills and Abuses, and Their Cures, in FRANKENSTEIN,
INCORPORATED 137-38 (1931) (highlighting the absence of law suited to address the
actually existing disconnect between investors and managers).
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IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’S TRANSNATIONAL DNA: A
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The search for such a law is as important today as it has ever
been. Our intervention in this endeavor seeks to show how treating
the corporation’s legal status solely from within corporate law and
its established doctrine is bound to fall short of developing a more
comprehensive legal concept of the corporation. It is out of that
concern that our analysis places the corporation in the context of a
political economy analysis of state transformation, privatization,
and globalization. These developments have led to a significant
reconfiguration of the landscape in which corporations operate and
in which different attempts at regulating corporate activity have
been and are being made. Corporate law, then, for us, is part of a
larger investigation into the relationship between law and the
changing political economy in an age of state transformation. It is
from that perspective that we focus our analysis on the connections
between the growing disillusionment with the corporation as a
seemingly untamable purveyor of power and the transnational
fragmentation of regulatory governance. As a result, we are
concerned with the challenges for an adequate political governance
regime vis-à-vis the corporation. In other words, it is our goal to
illustrate the continuities between the transformation of national
political economies in the names of marketization, privatization, and
globalization, on the one hand, and the emergence of hybrid, publicprivate regulatory regimes that appear to defy traditional
understandings of democratic legitimacy, on the other. Such a
project requires that we pay close attention to the “internal”
corporate law debates and, equally, look for evidence of how the
corporation is being experienced and contested outside that narrow
purview. It is here where we find intriguing revelations of
governance innovation that mark both corporate law and regulation
on a much larger scale. We are bound to learn much about the
cause-effect relationship that underlies traditional ideas of
regulation and that remains confined to an analysis of how a certain
outcome can be brought about by the intervention of A upon B.
Contemporary regulatory governance, however, reveals itself as a
complex process which involves context-dependent combinations of
planning and spontaneity, flexible shifting between strategy and
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improvisation, and the decentering of a designated “author” of a
decision by unstable coalitions and compromises among different
stakeholders with interests in the result—or, its avoidance.67
Seen in this light, corporate governance seems to be about more
than how companies are run and managed. Corporations, in fact,
are both the target for reform proposals and interventions, while
also being the co-producers and co-authors of their own regulatory
framework. Corporate governance emerges from an institutional
and procedural perspective as a continuously evolving assemblage
of norms, which, due to their hybrid nature between obligation and
recommendation, public order, and private standard, sit
uncomfortably with traditional notions of law as statute, court
order, or treaty. Today’s corporate governance norms display a
significantly broad regulatory focus, ranging from matters such as
board composition in terms of gender or race and risk oversight to
executive pay, shareholder activism, and non-financial reporting.
While this expansion of corporate governance is, at least in part, also
a response to changing societal attitudes towards today’s corporate
business enterprise and its enormous socioeconomic power over its
various stakeholders, the legal nature of “social,” “green,” or
“sustainable” corporate norm-making initiatives is by no means
settled and remains under-explored. 68 Furthermore, the more
recently emerging policy push for increased gender and racial

67
See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On Experimentation and Real Options in
Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S121, S123 (2014) (“[A]n issue that continually
plagues empirical corporate governance research is the challenge of using
observational studies to demonstrate much of anything, much less the likely effects
of novel reforms.”).
68
See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77,
78 (2017) (“Of all the social and economic challenges to the current state of Delaware
corporate law, perhaps the most potentially cataclysmic is the shift in attitudes
about the very purpose of corporations.”); see also Martin Lipton, Corporate
Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 11,
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-thenew-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/D7UE-SGMB] (“The effects of short-termism
are damaging to the economy as a whole. . . . To provide greater macroeconomic
and financial stability and to raise productivity, it is essential that markets work in
the public interest and for the long term rather than focusing only on short-term
returns.”).
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representation on corporate boards 69 and pay transparency, 70 as
well as for wider societal engagement with the “purpose” of the
corporation, 71 has to be seen against the background of longstanding critiques of mainstream corporate law’s blindness to
different structural forms of inequality and its alleged objective
neutrality.72
How does today’s corporate governance landscape and its
distinctly transnational constitution compare to the prevailing
understanding of corporate law as a predominantly domestic
concern, while only rarely an international or global concern? While
this is not the place for an exhaustive account of the origins of the
modern corporation and contemporary corporate governance, 73
69
See generally AARON A. DHIR, TOWARDS A RACE AND GENDER-CONSCIOUS
CONCEPTION OF THE FIRM: CANADIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LAW AND DIVERSITY
2-5 (Peer Zumbansen, John W. Cioffi & Lindsay Krauss eds., 2009),
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&co
ntext=clpe [https://perma.cc/9Z4L-AK5H] (highlighting the degree of
underrepresentation of females and racial minorities on corporate boards).
70
See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (analyzing the wide
degree of discretion for managers to sustain high levels of compensation while
preventing improvement regarding transparency); Sébastien Point & Shaun Tyson,
Top Pay Transparency in Europe: Codes, Convergences, and Clichés, 17 INT’L J. HUM. RES.
MGMT. 812 (2006) (providing a critical overview of emerging regulation and
corporate self-regulation regarding management compensation transparency).
71
See Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Our Commitment, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/
[https://perma.cc/5UQZ-WDXU]; see also Dionysia Katelouzou & Peer
Zumbansen, The Transnationalization of Corporate Governance: Law, Institutional
Arrangements & Corporate Power, 37 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601379 [https://perma.cc/L5AA-EFKE] (arguing that
the current debate around “corporate purpose” must be understood in light of both
historical perspective and the changing societal functions that corporations assume
today).
72
See, e.g., Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change,
1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 467-68 (2002) (asserting that corporate decisions based
on “shareholder wealth maximization” and “efficiency” often remain blind to their
impact on perpetuating gender inequalities).
73
For a historical account of the modern corporation, see, for example, Oscar
Gelderblom, Abe de Jong & Joost Jonker, The Formative Years of the Modern
Corporation: The Dutch East India Company VOC, 1602-1623, 73 J. ECON. HIST. 1050
(2013); Ron Harris, Law, Finance, and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE RULE OF LAW, 145 (James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson & Lee Cabatingan
eds., 2010); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West,
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there are two stories to follow here, and the distinction between
them will inform our ensuing analysis.
Within the discipline—the legal field of corporate law—the
theme of corporate governance emerged as a field of study in the
mid-1970s, and it was throughout the 20th century that corporate
governance scholarship and debate have stayed relatively close to
the general understanding of the corporation as, above all, an
investment vehicle. As a result, discussions among corporate law
scholars and practitioners mainly focused on a handful of key
themes and issues, including the operation, duties, and composition
of the board of directors, 74 as well as on the tension between
managerial authority and shareholder rights, 75 on executive
remuneration, and, to some degree, on the differences among
national systems of corporate governance. 76 The focus here was
predominantly on the functional role of corporate law. 77
The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 791 (2002).
74
See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the
Monitoring Board, and the Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623 (1981); Franklin
A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004).
75
See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v.
Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002).
76 See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2017) (putting forth a discussion
of comparative corporate law that is now considered a classic). For an overview of
the differences between the United States and the UK specifically, see CHRISTOPHER
M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013). For a discussion on the recent change
in the corporate governance debate in the United States see Our Commitment, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/
[https://perma.cc/5UQZ-WDXU]. For one of the most astute and perceptive
comparative accounts on comparative corporate governance see John W. Cioffi,
State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of
the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501 (2000) (offering an in-depth
overview of different countries’ approaches to corporate governance regulation in
the context of financial globalization).
77
Two classic accounts are FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (putting forth an economic
explanation of corporate law building on the law and economics of contracts), and
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2 (analyzing “the role of corporate law in
minimizing coordination and agency problems” to make “the corporate form
practicable”).
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Correspondingly, seeing the law’s role with regard to the
corporation as “enabling” 78 rather than mandatory, corporate
governance norms were measured primarily with regard to their
ability to facilitate the attraction of capital.79 Mirroring the rise in
the importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a
firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance rules
have been at the center of a continuing debate over how to best
organize and run a company.
Meanwhile, there has been for a long time a parallel corporate
governance discourse, which is concerned with the socio-economic
context of the actual firm. This discourse is grounded in a political
economy analysis of the historically evolving institutional and
normative frameworks that constitute the firm’s regulatory
environment, implicating a much expanded and contextual
perspective on the corporation and its manifold stakeholders. 80 A
political economy approach to the corporation breaks free from the
confines of explaining corporate governance by focusing only on the
“separation of ownership and control” which remains the standard
focus of corporate law.81 A political economy analysis of corporate
governance sees corporate law rules in relation to the laws that
govern industrial relations, social protection, and employment—but
also the environment.82 In that light, scholars of history, economics,
78
For an insightful discussion see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1626
(1989) (arguing that “in an economic environment increasingly dominated by
sophisticated institutional investors,” deviations from mandatory corporate law
standards should anticipate and respond to judicial competence in finding an
intermediate position between innovation and protection from opportunism). See
also Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 599, 601 (1965) (discussing the “enabling” philosophy of modern
American corporate law).
79
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 441-42. The authors observe that
the “standard shareholder-oriented model” has become consensus as it signals to
investors that managers should only be accountable to investors. Id.
80
In this regard see Katelouzou & Zumbansen, supra note 71, at 13-14.
81
See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983) (arguing that the separation between ownership, i.e.
shareholders who invest in the corporation, and control, i.e. managers who handle
that investment as agents of the shareholders, can be observed as standard model
in large corporations as well as in a number of other organizations).
82
See Joe DesJardins, Corporate Environmental Responsibility, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS
825, 826 (1998) (contrasting the neoclassical economic view of corporate
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sociology, politics, socio-legal change, and climate change situate
the study of corporate governance within the transformation context
of public and, increasingly, private governance regimes in more and
more areas of social, political, and economic areas of life. 83 The
difference in perspective between a more conceptual and this
contextual approach is crucial, especially when we seek to explain
the increasing significance of corporate governance regulation on a
global scale.84
The global dimension of corporate governance as a contested
and fast-evolving policy field is reflected in debates over the
organization of the firm, the rules governing the relationships
between shareholders and managers, the level of executive pay and
of diversity on the board, as well as the firm’s philanthropic and
environmental engagement, as they are intimately intertwined with
the dynamics of global investment. 85 Because a company’s
responsibility shaped by the belief that, ultimately, the corporation needs to
respond to and serve market interests with the emerging view among
environmentalists that economic growth is not a value in itself); Peter A. Hall &
Daniel W. Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the
Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 449, 452 (2009)
(describing how the varieties of capitalism approach considers how firms interact
with other external actors); Claire Methven O’Brien, Reframing Deliberative
Cosmopolitanism: Perspectives on Transnationalisation and Post-National Democracy
from Labor Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1007, 1031-38 (2008) (discussing the historical
relationship between labor law, corporate law, and social rights).
83 See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 2
(J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997) (arguing “that markets and
other coordinating mechanisms are shaped by and are shapers of social systems of
production”); see also Myria W. Allen & Christopher A. Craig, Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility in the Age of Climate Change: A Communication Perspective, INT’L
J. CORP. SOC. RESP., July 5, 2016, at 1, 1 (“Climate change challenges present
organizations (e.g. companies, corporations, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs)), communities, and citizens with the need to redefine current views on
corporate social responsibility (CSR) from a voluntary luxury as being a
necessity.”); Lobel, supra note 10, at 343-44 (describing the paradigmatic shift from
a regulatory model to a governance model, producing a mutually reinforcing
system of economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy).
84 See generally ALAN J. DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2009) (examining change and transformation in the
corporate governance systems of the UK, the US and Germany as a result of
economic globalization).
85 See Douglas Cumming, Igor Filatotchev, April Knill, David Mitchell Reeb &
Lemma Senbet, Editorial, Law, Finance, and the International Mobility of Corporate
Governance, 48 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 123, 125 (2017) (“The financial impact of good
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corporate governance set-up is received as a signal by the market for
corporate investment and translates into the firm’s traded value,
there is a constant push and pull between a firm’s efforts to attract
capital and its ability to prove its compliance with the type of
corporate governance that markets will reward.
These dynamics unfold across a turbulent history of scandal,
crisis, pressure for reform, and a wider debate regarding the place
and role of the large business firm in society.86 The opening decade
of the twenty-first century witnessed a series of large-scale corporate
scandals, including those of Enron, Royal Ahold, Parmalat, Satyam
and Tyco,87 and market failures, from the bursting of the dot-com
bubble in 2000-2001 to the Great Financial Crisis (“GFC”) in 20082009.88 While these events have been associated on different scales
with poor corporate governance practices or management
misconduct, and have significantly eroded public trust in large
corporations and businesses more generally, they have also been
formative in the creation of the current momentum of public debate
about the corporation, its purpose, and its responsibilities.

governance on the firm is unambiguously positive, both in terms of short-term
efficiency outcomes and longer-term sustainability of the business. Perhaps most
intuitive is that good governance, which minimizes the chance of managerial
tunneling—defined . . . as the expropriation of corporate assets or profits—leads to
an enhanced capability of the firm to raise external capital . . . . provide important
metrics for the robustness of governance at the firm level and find that good
governance firms have higher firm value, profits, and sales growth.”).
86
See Dorff, supra note 68, at 78-82 (discussing the shift in attitude about the
purpose of corporations, particularly with the rise of public benefit corporations);
Lipton, supra note 68 (describing the effects of “the New Paradigm” in corporate
governance).
87
For summaries of the scandals see Geeta Anand, The Satyam Scandal: Friends
Try to Reconcile 2 Sides of Indian Executive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A9; Gregory
Crouch, Ahold to Pay $1.1 Billion to Settle Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at
C10; Vanessa Valkin, Tyco Unwilling to Certify Accounts, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 24 2002, at
25; Looking Back at the Rise and Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 28, 2018, 10:25 AM
CST),
https://www.chron.com/local/history/economy-business/article/Therise-and-fall-of-Enron-9712210.php [https://perma.cc/3N8P-Y6LF]; How Parmalat
Went Sour, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2004, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-01-11/how-parmalat-went-so
ur [https://perma.cc/2N3L-Q75A].
88 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the
Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2009) (attributing the Great
Financial Crisis largely to economic dependence on the credit rating agencies and
to an increase in self-regulation).
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In trying to better understand the direction of contemporary
corporate governance norm-making, whether through the
proliferation of private ordering processes or the creation of codes,89
judicial intervention, 90 or legislative innovation, 91 one must
understand that these developments do not occur in a vacuum.
Instead, one has to consider the changes in the general political
economy after the height of the redistributive welfare state of the
1970s on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the transformation
that corporate law and corporate governance systems have
undergone since that time under the influence of globalizing capital
markets. As the end of “embedded liberalism”92 followed on the
89
See, e.g., Jean J. du Plessis & Chee Keong Low, Corporate Governance Codes
Under the Spotlight, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3-20
(Jean J. du Plessis & Chee Keong Low eds., 2017) (reflecting on the extent to which
corporate governance codes have contributed to improve corporate governance
practices); see also Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate
Governance and Globalization, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 129, 149 (2004) (discussing
the introduction of new corporate governance codes in European countries, as well
as changes in U.S. and Japanese practices, indicating a convergence toward the
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model).
90 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del. Ch.
2010) (holding that defendant directors’ ROFR/Dilutive Issuance failed the price
element of the entire fairness test and did not advance a proper corporate purpose,
rendering the Issuance invalid and constituting a breach of the directors’ duty of
loyalty); Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company,
CONGLOMERATE
(Sept.
9,
2010),
https://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modernversion-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/ALY6-QNMR]
(noting the court’s “unusual” application of the Unocal standard and assessment of
threat but its consistency overall with the court’s treatment of “minority oppression
cases”). But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding that corporations and unions are free to donate unlimited sums to election
campaigns, protected by the constitutional right of free speech).
91
See 79 Del. Laws, c. 122, § 8 (2020) (outlining the obligations of “public
benefit corporations” as for-profit corporations organized to produce a public
benefit); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right
Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 passim (2014) (arguing that “public benefit
corporation” statutes can create meaningful change in giving corporate managers
greater ability and an enforceable duty to “do the right thing”); Council Directive
2014/95, 2014 O.J. (L 330) (requiring large public-interest companies with more
than 500 employees to disclose non-financial and diversity information).
92
See generally John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 392,
passim (1982) (discussing the evolution of the post-World War II economy and
defining “embedded liberalism” as “[t]he liberalism that was restored after World
War II[, which] differed in kind from that which had been known previously”).
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abdication of the gold standard and the powerful take-off of global
financial flows, borders between differently legitimated regulatory
authorities became increasingly blurred. As public and private
regulators have been developing frameworks to more efficiently
meet sector-specific demands in a now globally integrated
marketplace for goods, services, capital, knowledge, and data, they
also raise difficult questions in terms of what they tell us about the
relationship between “public authority” and “private power.”93
Today, twenty years into the twenty-first century, corporate
scandals, including those of Olympus, Wells Fargo, Nissan, and
Sports Direct, continue to expose corporate governance gaps in
recent reforms and business practices94 with regard to, for example,
executive compensation, directors’ independence, institutional
investors, disclosure, or risk management. At the same time,
corporate governance debates today have widened significantly and
are concerned with the corporation itself and the recognition of and,
in fact, the active engagement with claims for gender equality,
environmental conservation, and climate change mitigation. 95
93
See Black & Rouch, supra note 47, at 223-28 (examining issues of legitimacy
in the global marketplace under the prevalence of private rulemaking). For a
critique of private ordering in a global context, see CUTLER, supra note 32.
94
See, e.g., Olympian Illogic: Europe and US Should Heed Lessons of Japanese
Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/a3f20100-0a2611e1-92b5-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/8RUG-GLHV]; Rachel Louise Ensign,
Wells Fargo Struggles to Regain Footing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2019, at B1; Leo Lewis,
Nissan’s Parable of Shoddy Governance, FIN. TIMES (May 12, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/d6aca7b8-39d9-11e9-9988-28303f70fcff
[https://perma.cc/67QV-G44G]; Deirdre Hipwell, Weak Pound and Governance
Scandal
Hits
Sports
Direct
Profits,
TIMES
(DEC.
8,
2016),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/weak-pound-and-governance-scandal-hitssports-direct-profits-22prcvb6c [https://perma.cc/JT7D-6RZ6]; see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 198, 206-09 (2005) (examining the Parmalat and Hollinger scandals
as examples of gatekeeper failure).
95
See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin, Corporate Governance That
‘Works for Everyone’: Promoting Public Policies Through Corporate Governance
Mechanisms, 18 J. CORP. L. STUD. 381, 400-03 (2018) (providing an overview of
corporate governance codes that increasingly task corporations with a
responsibility to promote diversity and with non-financial disclosure
requirements); see also Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards Accountable
Capitalism: Remaking Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Feb.
11,
2019),
ON
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/towards-accountable-capitalism-
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Reflected also in the current and deepening crisis of MBA programs
today,96 it is this wider and more comprehensive engagement with
the business corporation and its place in society that shapes much of
the debates at the moment, whether that concerns the largely
untamed “power” of corporations over labor, consumers, local
communities, and the environment, or the growing influence of “big
business” on social, economic, and political processes. 97 This
contextualization of the corporation not just as an investment
vehicle but as a powerful actor in a socio-economic, planetary
context in a state of dramatic transformation, 98 prompts an
appreciation of the company and its laws through a sociological and
historical lens. What now becomes clear is a non-linear, complex
trajectory of the business corporation from the time of Lochner99 and

remaking-corporate-law-through-stakeholder-governance/
[https://perma.cc/97S2-BT9A] (arguing that the main theories justifying
shareholder-primacy as the “dominant framework” of corporate governance
“ignore the reality that other groups of stakeholders beyond shareholders—
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and taxpayers—have a stake in
corporate productivity . . . . Under shareholder primacy, these stakeholders have
no voice inside an institution.”).
96
Peter Beusch, Towards Sustainable Capitalism in the Development of Higher
Education Business School Curricula and Management, 28 INT’L J. EDUC. MGMT. 523, 524
(2014); Ivor Hangout, The MBA, Disrupted; The Future of Management Education,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2019, at 14.
97
See, e.g., John Dunbar, The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why it Matters, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, (Oct. 18, 2012), https://publicintegrity.org/federalpolitics/the-citizens-united-decision-and-why-it-matters/
[https://perma.cc/VB3P-JSUA] (last updated May 10, 2018, 9:40 AM ET)
(discussing the political ramifications of the Citizens United decision).
98
See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REV. 155, 187
(2000) (noting that prison privatization, an example of government contracting with
private actors, has sparked a rigorous legal, political, and policy debate); IAN
HARDEN, NORMAN LEWIS & COSMO GRAHAM, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992)
(examining the influence of political party ideology and constitutional rights on the
role of contract in local government services in the United Kingdom); Catherine E.
Rudder, Private Governance as Public Policy: A Paradigmatic Shift, 70 J. POL. 899, 90609 (2008) (highlighting the expanded role of the private sector in public
policymaking and that of multinational corporations in solving “collective
problems.”).
99 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state maximum
hours statute was unconstitutional as it impermissibly interfered with employees’
freedom to contract with employers).
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Dodge100 through the period of the “affluent society”101 and the “new
property”102 on through the transnationalization of the corporation103
with its trials and tribulations104 until the present time as a central
nodal point in the acquisition and control of “information,” “data,”
and “knowledge.”105
The emerging new geographies of corporate governance also
mirror in part the reconfiguration of the state whose role is today
less and less that of a central anchor of regulatory authority, but a
co-regulator in an increasingly diverse constituency of norm
makers. Since the 1990s we have seen a surge in the creation of
corporate governance codes and best-practice guidelines in
countries all around the world, 106 the main drivers for this
100
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (holding that the
defendant corporation’s decision not to release additional shareholder dividends
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).
101
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958) (analyzing the
increase in economic disparities between the private and public sectors following
the rise of consumerism after World War II).
102
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964)
(discussing the growth of “government largess,” or the property and “valuables”
received from individuals and entities derived from the government).
103
See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 740-44 (1970) (introducing the difficulty
posed by the multinational enterprise, stemming from shortcomings in the legal
recognition of international corporations).
104
See, e.g., Jennifer Bair & Florence Palpacuer, CSR Beyond the Corporation:
Contested Governance in Global Value Chains, 15 GLOB. NETWORK (SUPPLEMENTAL
ISSUE) S1 (2015); Ruggie, supra note 9; Christina Stringer & Snejina Michailova, Why
Modern Slavery Thrives in Multinational Corporations’ Global Value Chains, 26
MULTINATIONAL BUS. REV. 194, 196-201 (2018); Peer Zumbansen, What is Economic
Law? 1 (Transnat’l L. Inst., Research Paper 20/2020, 2020).
105
See Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New
Construct for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220 (2018) (arguing for a
transnational legal framework to govern data ownership and property rights); Ivan
Stepanov, Introducing a Property Right Over Data in the EU: The Data Producer’s
Right—an Evaluation, 34 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTS. & TECH. 65 (2020) (advocating for
the recognition of formal data producer’s rights under EU law). See also VIKTOR
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG
DATA 179 (2018) (“The system, even if perhaps appearing to promote liberal values,
would make George Orwell blush and the East German Stasi salivate: seeming
freedom on the outside but total state control on the inside.”).
106
RHYS JENKINS, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL
ECONOMY
1
(2001),
https://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/E3B3E78BAB9A8
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development, arguably, remained the attempt on the part of
different sovereign states to render their corporate governance
regimes more amenable and, effectively, more attractive for capital
flows and investment practices which have become increasingly
volatile and impatient. In recent years, however, states have come
under even greater pressure from powerful private actors that
administer enormous financial funds and have begun to claim a
growing stake in setting the regulatory parameters for world-wide
corporate investment, often in concomitance with market-driven
regulatory incentives.107
The new and continuously evolving processes of regulatory
innovation are generating a diversified and particular set of norms,
which go far beyond the governance scope that had still
characterized the first-generation corporate governance codes. 108
Today, there is no doubt that, despite the shareholder value
maximization idea’s fast rebound after the GFC, the discourse has
begun to shift in a number of directions. 109 Leaving behind a
somewhat stale and never fully satisfactory track record of corporate
social responsibility (“CSR”) initiatives, at least since the 1960s, it
appears that today CSR is being transformed into a more ambitious
and more comprehensive governance idea.110 This new generation
86F80256B5E00344278/$file/jenkins.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8Z7-ZZKF] (“The
1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis
on corporate responsibility. This was a result of economic developments in the
1980s, which saw a major shift away from the social democratic and Keynesian
interventionism of the postwar period in the North, and from import substituting
industrialization and statism in the South. The emphasis on monetarist economic
policies and increased integration of international markets for goods and finance,
the massive privatization of state assets and, in developing countries, the shift to
trade liberalization and export promotion, all served to redefine the economic role
of the state.”).
107 See infra Part VI.
108 See infra Part V.c.
109 See infra Part V.a.
110 See, e.g., Banu Ozkazanc-Pan, CSR as Gendered Neocoloniality in the Global
South, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 851, 856-57 (2019) (“CSR initiatives in the Global South
focus on ‘giving’ factory workers a particular set of rights that mimic those we
might see in developed nations in the West, such as safe working conditions.”); Dirk
Matten & Jeremy Moon, Reflections on the 2018 Decade Award: The Meaning and
Dynamics of Corporate Social Responsibility, 45 ACAD. MGT. REV. 7, 9 (2020) (“First,
many CSR issues are concerned with the wider responsibilities that companies take
for some of their potential negative impacts in their supply chains and even their
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of CSR no longer pits shareholders against stakeholders as
representatives of two neatly distinguishable constituent groups of
the modern business corporation, but is grounded in the societal
transformation that companies have been involved in the context of
the privatization of formerly public functions on the level of the
nation state and beyond.
What emerges before our eyes is both a fragmented—in terms of
the specific regulatory authority of various involved actors—and, at
the same time, spatialized—in terms of the global reach of relevant
regulatory regimes—assemblage of corporate governance
architectures. While their focus is still on the business corporation
and its core concerns as an investment vehicle, corporate
governance norms today take on board a diverse and pluralistic set
of concerns and interests, which are in turn promoted by traditional
(state) and non-traditional (private) “lawmaking” actors. The
proliferation of the latter is grounded in different countries’
particular histories of state transformation and privatization, on the
one hand, while developing in tandem with a global rise of private
ordering and standard setting, on the other.111 It is this co-existence
of public and private normative institutional frameworks of
contemporary corporate governance that gives rise to a
transnational multiplication of hybrid, public and private, national
and international corporate law production.112 Given the extensive
role that corporations play in the context of an almost infinite
number of societal affairs and in consideration of the variation of
value chains (e.g., unsafe working conditions, slavery-like terms of employment,
pollution, resource depletion). Second, many companies are increasingly focused
on the impacts of their operations on the planet at large (e.g., policies related to
climate change, species diversity, natural resource depletion).“ (citation omitted)).
111
See NILS BRUNSSON & BENGT JACOBSSON, A WORLD OF STANDARDS 46-47
(2002) (arguing that private standards embody expert knowledge which is used for
governance purposes); see also TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL
RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2013)
(arguing that in a number of regulatory areas governments continue to delegate
regulatory authority to private sector bodies).
112 See generally Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Andreas Nölke & Henk Overbeek,
The Transnational Political Economy of Corporate Governance Regulation: A Research
Outline (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Working Papers Political Science No. 5,
2003), https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/74100928/137F9259-D62F46C8-AC0A5F4C6F592E4B [https://perma.cc/8J4J-5PAK] (outlining a research
project to analyze what led to the hybridization of public and private corporate
regulation).
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specific instruments and institutional forms that corporate
governance rules take on in different parts of the world, we can
speak of a plurality of political economies of corporate governance today.
In the context of this newly emerging transnational geography
of corporate governance, the traditional corporate governance
narratives, which have their foundation in a law and economics
understanding of the corporation, have limited analytical value. By
contrast, while the contextual approach suggested here places
corporate governance in a field of contestation, that arguably
extends beyond organizational matters related to executive pay or
board composition, it also seems the only way to effectively address
the corporation in its actual operational environment. It is in that
regard that we argue for a reconceptualization of corporate law and
corporate governance as a transnational regulatory concern which is
part of a law and political economy analysis of how corporations are
regulated as part of a larger critical engagement with the
relationship between states and markets.113 Corporate governance
regulation must, in our view, be described as transnational because
it cuts across the boundaries between the domestic and the
international, the public and the private. Transnational as a
category, then, is of lesser value in neatly demarcating jurisdictional
borders than it is in exposing the doctrinal and conceptual premises
based on which an issue is associated with the domestic or the
international arena. By instead focusing on the transnational
landscape of different actors, norms, and processes, which include, but
are not limited to, states, laws, court decisions, and parliamentary
lawmaking, it becomes possible to understand the transnational law
of corporate governance as a methodology of (or a particular area
of) law in a global context.114
113 See GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 1314 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (identifying a number of
financial disasters caused by the lack of governmental regulation and oversight);
YVES TIBERGHIEN, ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
FRANCE, JAPAN, AND KOREA 1 (2007) (contrasting stakeholder or coordinated
economies with liberal Anglo-Saxon systems concerning the different approaches
towards regulating corporations).
114
Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, 898, 898-925 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012) (arguing that
transnational law is global and interdisciplinary); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational
Law, With and Beyond Jessup, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL
ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL 1 (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020).
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V. THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I: MISCONCEPTIONS,
DEAD ENDS, AND CIRCULARITY
In this Part, we set out to chart the emerging political economies
of contemporary corporate governance against the historical and
sociological background of corporate governance regulation and
state transformation over the past four decades. We will do so
through a critique of the three aforementioned scholarly binds
which have largely determined corporate law debates through the
present moment. The first one concerns the juxtaposition of
shareholder primacy and stakeholder-oriented theories of corporate
governance. The second bind results from a dualistic, either-or
thinking that has been shaping much of the debate around
convergence/divergence and harmonization versus so-called
“regulatory competition.” Finally, the third one, which we will
critically review, concerns the distinction between so-called “hard”
and “soft” law. In each case, we will try to show how a more
differentiated, less oppositional thinking can bring the analysis
much closer to the actual reality of corporate governance today.
a. “Scholarly Bind One”: The Vain Competition between Shareholder
Versus Stakeholder Conceptions of the Corporation
The emergence of corporate governance as a topic of interest
among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners of corporate law
and the political economy of the firm coincided with the fading of
the “business stateman” 115 and the rising prevalence of what has
variously been termed as the “contractarian,” “nexus of contracts,”
or “private ordering” theory of the firm.116 During a period when
economic theories prevailed, corporate governance was mainly
A magisterial presentation can be found in BERLE, supra note 27.
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (arguing that in a
corporation decisions are based on a contractual arrangement as part of a team
productive process); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 311 (“The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for
contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of
divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.”).
115
116
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studied through the neoclassical economic lens of agency theory.117
For the proponents of agency theory, corporate governance mainly
deals with the balance of power between “the three key players—
the executives, the board of directors and the shareholders,”118 while
the aim of analysis is to reduce the organizational costs of running
business through corporations, 119 and to maximize shareholder
value on the basis of shareholders’ residual claims on the
corporation.120 Agency theory, along with other economic theories
of the firm,121 had far-reaching effects on the study of the internal
organization and power structure of the corporation, the
functioning and interrelationships among the allegedly key
corporate actors (board of directors, shareholders, and
management), and their relationships with other stakeholders—
particularly labor and creditors.122
For the time being, however, much of the political contestation
surrounding corporate governance continues to be organized
around the dualistic poles of shareholder primacy versus
stakeholder welfare. From this opposition follows the assertion of
whether and, if so, which countries have “converged” towards
117
See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 81 (analyzing the separation of
management and risk-bearing functions, a characteristic of corporations, in noncorporate entities).
118
ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINNOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE xvii (5th ed.
2011). For a recent account of corporate governance, see Marianna Pargendler, The
Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 passim (2016).
119 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200-01
(1984) (examining the issue of corporate governance as that of “transaction cost
economics” which approaches “the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and
contends that a leading but widely neglected purpose of economic organization is
to economize on the costs of transacting over time”).
120
Fama & Jensen, supra note 81, at 302-03.
121
Transaction cost economics also supported shareholder governance,
perceiving shareholders as the only corporate constituents that cannot protect
themselves from firm-specific risk. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); see
also Benjamin M. Oviatt, Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the ManagerShareholder Relationship: Incentives for Congruent Interests, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 214,
216-23 (1988) (using agency and transaction cost theories to propose ten hypotheses
to explore the relationship between top managers and shareholders and stimulate
further research).
122
See JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR
PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 120-26 (2004) (discussing the role of “agency problems”
in corporate decision-making).
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shareholder value or continue to “diverge” in that regard. But in the
post-GFC world the convergence theorists’ claim of shareholder
primacy’s quasi-universal status has come under attack in both
theory and practice circles.123 While the “normative” embers of both
the shareholder primacy norm and the stakeholder theory still
smolder even after more than ten years since the GFC, one of the key
aspects of corporate governance regulation of the 21st century is the
increasing emphasis on the what might (again) be called the
“public” dimension of the corporation and of the law relating to it
in the unfolding political economies of regulatory corporate
governance. 124 As we see in the increasingly heated discussion
around the “purpose” of the corporation, the calls for a
reconceptualization of the corporation and of corporate law have
come a long way from the CSR stand-offs in the early 1930s125 and
the convergence/divergence discussion in the 1990s and early
2000s.126
Looking at the United States as a case in point for the dominance
of the shareholder primacy view, much of American corporate law
scholarship in the last fifty years is aimed at finding a mechanism to
minimize the agency costs that arise from separation of ownership
and control and bolstering better corporate governance through
hostile takeovers, independent directors, performance-based
remuneration, and activist shareholders.127 At the same time, from
a teleological perspective, three alternative analytic models, that is

123 See, e.g., BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING
(César Rodriguez-Garavito ed., 2017); BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017).
124 See supra Part II.
125
For a discussion of CSR during the 1930s, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
126 See infra Part V.b.
127
See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 70; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43
STAN. L. REV. 863, 868-71 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
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shareholder primacy,128 director primacy,129 and team production,130
prevailed (and still do, to a large extent) in U.S. scholarship, offering
differing views on what should be seen as the proper purpose of the
corporation. Both shareholder primacy and director primacy
models—derived from neoclassical views of the firm—privilege
shareholders relative to other corporate constituents and are
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, 131 even though
they take contrary positions to the retention of the status quo of
managerial control in U.S. companies and the merits of shareholder
governance.132 By contrast, the team production theory of Margaret
M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout133 insulates directors from shareholders’
direct control, exposing shareholder primacy as a myth. 134 Even
though the team production theory seems to align with stakeholder
theories of corporate governance,135 Blair and Stout focus only on
128
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
680-82 (2007) (analyzing the checks available to shareholders over directorial
power).
129
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002) (“Managerialism perceives
the corporation as a bureaucratic hierarchy dominated by professional managers.”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 601, 616-18 (2006) (arguing that shareholders, in practice, have little power
over corporate decision-making).
130
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (noting that under the team production
approach, the purpose of concentrating managerial powers in the board of directors
is to “protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate
‘team’”). But see Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 129, 142 (2009) (arguing that the team production theory does not account
for the varying degrees of shareholder influence over corporate decision-making).
131
STEPHEN M BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 65-72 (2008).
132
See, e.g., Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 65556 (2011).
133
Blair & Stout, supra note 130. This theory is built on Raghuram C. Rajan
and Luigi Zingales’ theory of the firm which is based on the property rights
approach. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm,
113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 390-91 (1998).
134
See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2002).
135
Blair & Stout, supra note 130, at 280-81 (arguing that directors are “trustees
for the corporation itself”).
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the firm-specific contributions of numerous constituencies. A
“mediating” board, meanwhile, does not necessarily protect
stakeholders, 136 as it “remain[s] subject to equity market
pressures.” 137 Critics of shareholder value maximization in the
United States advanced the argument that the firm-specific
contributions of all corporate constituents should be considered.138
In the same vein, they championed the board’s superior decisionmaking freedom to weigh various interests in the balance defending
(perhaps paradoxically for the non-U.S. audience) the status quo of
managerial control.139
Economic literature associated the stakeholder perspective with
the property rights analysis of the firm in asserting that not only
shareholders but also other corporate constituents, such as
employees, can be residual claimants in investing in specific human
capital. 140 Alternative arguments in support of a stakeholders
mandate in the firm have often been associated with the CSR
movement, 141 while being mainly derived from the stakeholder
theory of the corporation. Even though the classic stakeholder
theory statement can be traced to Dodd’s writings in the early 20th
century, 142 stakeholder theories made their way into academic
circles (mainly in management literature) after the 1980s,143 relying
136
David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team
Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 passim (2000); George W. Dent,
Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of
Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213 passim (2008).
137
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 435 (2001).
138
Blair & Stout, supra note 130, at 253 (“Boards exist not to protect
shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the
members of the corporate “team,” including shareholders, managers, rank and file
employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.”).
139
See Gelter, supra note 132, at 646 (elaborating that “pro-stakeholder”
arguments served completely different aims in the US from similar theories in
France and Germany).
140 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765-73 (1989); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121-22 (1990).
141
The CSR literature is voluminous. For a good summary of the CSR
literature, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization, 35 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711-17 (2002).
142
See Dodd, supra note 125.
143
The literature is voluminous. For a landmark publication, see R. EDWARD
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
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on a range of theoretical bases and evidently displaying varying
definitions of normative and policy purpose. 144 Under the
stakeholder perspective, corporations engage with a variety of
different stakeholders including insiders—shareholders, managers,
and employees—and outsiders—creditors, suppliers, and
customers. “Progressive” U.S. corporate scholars have advanced a
multi-stakeholder concept of the corporation under which corporate
managers and directors can be understood to owe consideration
(and perhaps even fiduciary duties) to a wider range of corporate
constituents than shareholders, including obligations to employees,
consumers, suppliers, communities, and the environment. 145 Yet,
such a broad stakeholder approach has mostly remained on the
sidelines and stakeholders mainly refer to non-shareholder
constituencies who bear the risk of the firm’s activities. At the same
time, the predominant academic assumption in the United States—
except for the middle decades of the century (1940’s-1970’s) where
managerialism in North America and Europe coincided with public,
societal interests—maintains that corporations as private, economic
entities should be run for the collective benefit of shareholders.
Corporate governance in the UK, like the United States, has been
largely occupied by the assumptions of neoclassical economics and
the agency problems between investors and management, 146 and
has, in general, privileged shareholders among all the corporate
constituents. Departures from the doctrine of shareholder value can
be found in the work of the Bullock Committee in the 1980s and,
more recently, in reforms addressing the directors’ account to wider
The latter has its roots in the statutory
stakeholders. 147
144
See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 66-67
(1995); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 passim.
145
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE & SOCIETY (1995); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006).
146
For a comprehensive law and economics analysis of English company law,
see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997).
147
See ALAN BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY AND INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY (1977); DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
REFORM,
GREEN
PAPER
34-43
(2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/584013/corporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf
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reformulation of the common law directors’ fiduciary duty to act
bona fide for the interest of the company 148 into the “enlightened
shareholder value” (ESV) principle encapsulated in section 172 of
the UK Companies Act 2006.149 Section 172 provides a legislative
imperative blended with improved information flow and greater
disclosure that enables directors to consider wider stakeholder
interests when making decisions.150 The UK stance, therefore, parts
course to some degree from the counterpart United States
shareholder-oriented model,151 but section 172 lags behind in terms
of setting a true stakeholder mandate.152 This is despite the recent
strengthening of the reporting requirements relating to section
[https://perma.cc/BV8X-Q3AB] (offering approaches to strengthening a wider
stakeholder voice); DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM: THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER
CONSULTATION
24-35
(2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/640631/corporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7AE-TR8D] (discussing efforts to strengthen wider
stakeholder voices).
148
Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 425 (UK) (“Directors must dispose of
their company’s shares on the best terms obtainable, and must not allot them to
themselves or their friends at a lower price in order to obtain a personal benefit.
They must act bona fide for the interests of the company.”).
149
The Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172 (UK). Note that UK policymakers
have rejected the pluralist approach, a variant of stakeholder theory based on a
property analysis of the firm. See COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN
COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK 83-150
(2000); 1 COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 43 (2001) (referring to paragraph 3.16
addressing liability upon insolvency); DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS 135-38 (2009) (referencing Annex 3, discussing broadening
statutory responsibility of the board to place employees and others on par with
shareholders).
150
For recent empirical evidence on the effectiveness of strategic reporting in
the UK, see Irene-Marie Esser, Iain MacNeil & Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna,
Engaging Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making Through Strategic Reporting: An
Empirical Study of FTSE 100 Companies, 29 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 729 (2018).
151
For a distinction between the UK stance and the United States shareholderoriented model, see BRUNER, supra note 76, at 29-65.
152
On the effectiveness of the ESV, see Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder
Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the
United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 329, 341-43 (2006); Georgina
Tsagas, Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Desperate Times Call for Soft Law
Measures, in SHAPING THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE: TOWARDS CORPORATE REFORM AND
ENTERPRISE DIVERSITY 131-50 (Nina Boeger & Charlotte Villiers eds., 2018).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

102

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

172, 153 which aims to assist non-shareholder groups in holding
company directors accountable as part of a broader framework to
enable more effective board engagement with the workforce and
wider stakeholders in order to gain a better and more grounded
understanding of their views.154 Neither, however, fundamentally
changed the UK corporate governance system due to the lack of
consensus regarding the desirability of employee participation on
company boards.155 As one of us has argued elsewhere,156 the recent
reforms cannot alone strengthen the way in which the interests of
employees, customers, and wider stakeholders are considered at
board level. This is partly because increasing the stakeholder
orientation of UK companies will require a more fundamental
“cultural” change, and partly because UK corporate governance still
mainly relies on the combination of transparency, disclosure, and
market participants’ actions to remedy undesirable outcomes.
Qualifying such reform as impossible, given the supposedly
overwhelming requirement of a wholesale transformation of the
prevailing “culture,” echoes the corporate governance debate of the
late 1990s, which was steeped in seemingly uncompromising
positions of ideological opposition.157 Over time the circumstances
of the opposition of the “convergence” and “divergence” camps
have continued to change. While it is too early to provide any
reasonable assessment of what a post-Brexit UK culture of corporate

153
See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
Provision 5, at 5 (2018); The Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 414CZA (UK).
154
This link between ESV and board composition is manifested in Provision
5 of the 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code itself, supra note 149, which combines
the reporting requirements relating to § 172 with three alternative mechanisms to
engage with the workforce: a director appointed from the workforce, a formal
workforce advisory panel, or a designated non-executive director.
155
For more on this long-standing debate, see Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly,
Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110
passim (2001).
156
Dionysia Katelouzou, Aditi Gupta & Gerhard Schnyder, ‘More Teeth Needed
for Corporate Governance Reforms’: Response to the Dept. BEIS Green Paper on Corporate
Governance
Reform
3
(2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921800
[https://perma.cc/RQ5J-XQXY].
157
Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, with Simon Deakin, The
Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 11 passim (2005).
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governance could look like, 158 the example of Hong Kong’s
surprising tenacity in opposing a centralist Chinese government in
the drawn-out summer of 2019 might serve as a reminder of how
cultures can change and adapt.159
In addition, what requires our attention is that despite the
predominantly shareholder-oriented perspective of corporations
and business performance, the UK debate has often arrived at
different conclusions in relation to the corporation’s obligations and
duties to society, which are explained by the fact that UK company
law, unlike U.S. corporate law, is conceptually built on shareholder
governance, 160 and UK shareholders—particular institutional
investors that have dominated UK public equity since the 1990s—
have been portrayed as “stewards” 161 of the companies in which
they invest. Yet, what the UK example shows is that scholarly
arguments in support of a broader stakeholder mandate were
deeply influenced by economic theories. The dissenting pluralist
approach in the UK,162 similar to the team production theory in the
United States, supports the allocation of governance rights to all the
158
But see John Armour, Holger Fleischer, Vanessa Knapp & Martin Winner,
Brexit and Corporate Citizenship, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 225, 231-47 (2017)
(evaluating the future possibilities of the legal status of corporate citizens of the EU
in light of the Brexit decision). See also Peter Swabey, Corporate Governance: The
Brexit
Effect,
CHARTERED
GOVERNANCE
INST.
BLOG,
https://www.icsa.org.uk/knowledge/blog/corporate-governance-the-brexit-effe
ct [https://perma.cc/7ZUZ-6REQ] (suggesting Brexit will have a minimal impact
on corporate governance but emphasizing the highly uncertain nature of such
impact).
159
See Jean-Philippe Béja, Is Hong Kong Developing a Democratic Political
Culture?, 2 CHINA PERSP. 4 passim (2007); Francis L. F. Lee & Joseph M. Chan, Making
Sense of Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong
Kong, 193 CHINA Q. 84, 84-90 (2008); Chuanli Xia & Fei Shen, Political Participation in
Hong Kong: The Roles of News Media and Online Alternative Media, 12 INT’L J.
COMMC’N. 1569 (2018); Peter Pomarantsev, The Counteroffensive Against Conspiracy
Theories
Has
Begun,
ATLANTIC,
(Aug.
7,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/evolution-protests
-conspiracy-theories-disinformation/595639/ [https://perma.cc/89TL-TUW4].
160 See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 76, at 29-36.
161 See infra Part VII.
162 See JOHN E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (1993) 23, 32-50 (viewing companies as “social
enterprises” and arguing that companies purpose is to create “social wealth” on the
basis of a revised property rights theory); see also Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly,
Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110, 115
(2001).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

104

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

corporate constituents that bear firm-specific risk and is, therefore,
normatively different from the more “societal” stakeholder theories
of company law as these developed in Continental Europe and
Japan in the 20th century.
In Germany and France, for instance, institutional theories of
corporate law had a great appeal for most of the 20th century as they
were seen as a tool to protect the firm and all of its stakeholders
against controlling shareholders’ opportunism, an issue that was of
little significance in countries with dispersed ownership structures
such as the United States and the UK.163 However, institutionalism
along with the idea of stakeholderism that tends to be associated
with it seems to have been losing some of its once important status
as German corporate governance gradually shifted in the 1990s
away from state control and further towards capital markets.164 One
explanation for this could be the internationalization of the debate
in the wake of the ECJ case law following the Centros case,165 the rise
of regulatory competition and other forces of international
convergence.166
Japan’s corporate governance system, on the other hand,
displayed a high degree of “institutional isomorphism,” particularly
from the 1960s to 1990s, with a strong emphasis on maintaining
firm-specific capabilities generated by the investment of

163
For a good overview of the influence of the theory of the German
corporation as “enterprise in itself” (Unternehmen an sich) and the French doctrine
of the “interest of the association of the corporation” (intérêt social or intérêt de la
société) to the stakeholder orientation of Germany and France, respectively, see
Gelter, supra note 132, at 678.
164
See Jackson & Moerke, supra note 4, at 352-53; Gregory Jackson, Stakeholders
Under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour Management in Germany and Japan,
13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 419, 419-25 (2005) (evaluating the linkage between changes
in corporate governance and labour management in Germany and Japan); see also
PHILIPP KLAGES, THE CONTRACTUAL TURN: HOW LEGAL ACADEMICS SHAPED
CORPORATE
LAW
REFORMS
IN
GERMANY
(2008),
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Contractual-Turn-%3A-How-Lega
l-Academics-Shaped-Klages/36c0182a983dbbc638bff07847ea807abc85ac9b
[https://perma.cc/57FE-LCUH] (detailing the evolution of Germany’s corporate
governance regime and the role of legal scholarship in such reforms).
165
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
I-1459.
166 See infra Part V.b.
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stakeholders, such as employees.167 Despite the substantial changes
in corporate governance practices and the related reforms in the past
thirty years that aimed to help Japanese firms to adapt their
stakeholder model of corporate governance to market pressures,
such reforms mainly serve a symbolic function. As a result, a
complete shift to a shareholder-oriented model of corporate
governance is unlikely to take place in Japan.168
Having already pointed to some of the limitations of insisting on
the “comparative advantages” of different national corporate
governance systems without taking into account the consequences
of financialization and hybridization of transnational corporate law
norm creation, the just offered glimpses into the cases of German
and Japanese corporate governance suggest that, in effect, context
matters. As such, it is important to keep at least some cautious
distance from an overly self-fulfilling law and economics argument
whereby the rise of shareholder value maximization is not only
inevitable, but also comprehensive and without alternatives.
Scrutinizing the tunnel vision of the dominant shareholder valueoriented understanding of corporate governance, Lynn Stout found,
for instance, that such thinking “drives directors and executives to
run public firms like [British Petroleum] with a relentless focus on
raising stock price.“169
More recent literature, especially in the context of transnational
human rights litigation against multinational corporations
(“MNCs”) and with regard to corporations as part of global value
chains, underscores the importance of local context and emphasizes
the need to closely scrutinize the relations between corporations and
167
For a detailed account of the traditional Japanese corporate governance
system, see Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima, Introduction: The Diversity and
Change of Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN:
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 1 passim (Masahiko Aoki,
Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima eds., 2007).
168
See SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 166-67
(2007) (empirically elaborating that “[t]hose who think that the large Japanese
corporation will gradually morph into its American counterpart are mistaken” and
concluding that “there is a symbolic motivation behind some of the governance
reforms being adopted by Japanese companies, who wish to appear sensitive to
foreign shareholders even when – or because – the reforms do not cut deep”).
169
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3 (2012).
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local communities.170 This orientation casts a new light, on the one
hand, on who must be considered as a “stakeholder” and as being
affected by the corporation and, on the other, which wider societal
and environmental interests may be considered to be in the scope of
a corporation’s “sphere of influence,” a term which, since the failure
of the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, was widely perceived as needing further specification and
contributed to the mandate for John G. Ruggie as the then newly
appointed U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Business and Human Rights. 171 What both VoC and post-VoC
critiques of corporate governance developments show is a much
more differentiated and layered landscape of norm production,
which cannot adequately be depicted on the basis of uni-directional
normative assessments.172 The same critique can apply to part of the
comparative corporate governance literature where it evolves
around the adaptation of purportedly global standards as we will
explore further in the next section.
170
See, e.g., POOJA PARMA, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS,
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015); Christiana Ochoa, Generating Conflict: Gold, Water and
Vulnerable Communities in the Colombian Highlands, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW PERSPECTIVES 142
(Celine Tan & Julio Faúndez eds., 2017); Lauren Coyle, Tender Is the Mine: Law,
Shadow Rule, and the Public Gaze in Ghana, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY?
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 297 (Charlotte Walker-Said & John
Dunham Kelly eds., 2015).
171
A helpful, critical discussion is provided by Denis G. Arnold, Transnational
Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371 (2010).
See also John Gerard Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights 11 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Corp. Resp. Initiative, Working
Paper No. 67, 2017) (“The mandate was modest: to identify and clarify standards
and best practices in the area of business and human rights, for both states and
business enterprises; to clarify such concepts as ‘corporate complicity’ in human
rights abuses committed by a related party, as well as ‘corporate sphere of
influence . . . .’”).
172
See Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate,
Incomplete, and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1428-34 (approving of Rafael La
Porta’s, Francisco Lopez-de-Salinas’s, Andrei Shleifer’s, and Robert Vishny’s
research noting evidence of some companies with controlling shareholders
outperforming those without); see also Ronald Gilson, From Corporate Law to
Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE 1, 18 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (arguing that
such “one-factor corporate governance models are too simple to explain the realworld dynamics we observe”).
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b. “Scholarly Bind Two”: Convergence versus Divergence and
Harmonization Versus Regulatory Competition
Comparative work in corporate governance has been largely
shaped by the shareholder value oriented agenda. 173 Despite a
widely shared appreciation of corporate law being both an
ingredient as well as a product of a national legal culture, the last
twenty years at least have seen an enormous boost of the idea of
there being an overarching set of principles in corporate law which
contribute to what many scholars have been describing as a global
convergence of corporate governance principles. The law and
economics narrative has been crucial here as it has been
emphasizing agency costs as a core problem being faced across
different corporate governance systems.174 In the background of this
debate lies the older and more fundamental distinction of corporate
governance systems along the degree to which they may be
categorized as being either “outsider”/arm’s length or
“insider”/control-oriented systems.175 The received wisdom is that
the former—characterized by publicly held companies with diffuse
share ownership structures—exist in the United Kingdom and the
United States, while the latter—characterized by fewer publicly
traded companies per capita and more ownership concentration—
predominates in different forms in Continental Europe and Pacific
Asia.176 Under agency theory, the primary principal-agent conflict
unfolds in a different manner across the two corporate governance

173 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing But Wind”? The Past and Future of
Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 105-09 (2011). For an
insightful discussion of the different institutional environments that shape the
shareholder value norm, see John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J.
Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531 passim (2003), and Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value,
Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: A Post-Enron Reassessment of the
Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 53 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003).
174 See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART
AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy
Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds., 1998).
175
See Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CONTROL OF
CORPORATE EUROPE 1 (Fabrizo Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001).
176
Id. at 1-3.
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systems. 177 The conflict between shareholders and the board of
directors is predominant in outsider systems, while in insider
systems the dominant agency problem is generated by the conflict
between minority and majority shareholders.178 Despite the agency
problem being different, comparative corporate governance
literature, especially in the late 1990s, focused on the core agency
problem between management and shareholders even in countries
with prevailing block holders, such as Germany,179 even though a
separation of ownership and control is the exception worldwide
rather than the rule.180 More recently, the now eleven authors of The
Anatomy of Corporate Law argue that one of the functions of corporate
law (irrespective of the laws of specific jurisdictions) is to minimize
coordination costs and agency problems among corporate
constituents, including those between managers and shareholders,
minority and majority shareholders, and other stakeholders. 181
They emphasize the “functional” 182 commonality of legal responses
to these problems across different jurisdictions.183
The law and economics approach to comparative corporate
governance and the associated advancement of the social norm of

177 See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in
Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117, 137-38 (2007) (exploring the impact of
different corporate governance reforms in Continental Europe and the United
States).
178
Becht & Mayer, supra note 175, at 7.
179
See, e.g., Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 943 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch &
Stefan Prigge eds., 1998).
180
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 502-05 (1999) (finding the
controlling shareholder does not have another large shareholder in the same firm
in seventy-five percent of the cases, and this number is seventy-one percent
for family controlling shareholder).
181
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2-3. This latest edition focuses on seven
countries, namely Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United
States.
182
See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW,
34-40 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of
Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 340, 340-43
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (providing a detailed
overview of the functional method of comparative law).
183
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 2-3.
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shareholder primacy 184 was famously epitomized by Hansmann
and Kraakman in their highly influential article, “The End of History
for Corporate Law.”185 Published just at the turn of the 21st century,
the two leading corporate law scholars proclaimed the dominance
of the economic-oriented analysis of corporate law and corporate
governance, and the convergence towards what they describe as the
“Anglo-American shareholder-oriented model” of corporate
governance. 186 Hansmann and Kraakman emphasized economic
(efficient) market considerations based on accelerated competition
among firms over “best practices” triggered by globalization forces
and the rise of the “shareholder class.” 187 They referred to both
functional and formal convergence with the latter following rather
than leading the former.188 The convergence thesis was met with
immediate attention and led to voluminous literature attacking and
replying to it. An early criticism came from Douglas Branson who
argued that the “The End of History for Corporate Law” consists of
“bald assertions” and that any convergence in corporate governance
is more likely to be regional rather than global.189 In a similar vein,
Curtis Milhaupt argued—on the basis of a property rights
184
For a distinction between the social norm of shareholder primacy and the
legal requirement of shareholder value maximization in the UK and other
jurisdictions, see Beate Sjåfjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen & David
Millon, Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, in COMPANY
LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 79 (Beate Sjåfjell &
Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015).
185
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.
186
Id. at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
187 Id. at 450-53. On the impact of globalization on comparative corporate
governance, see Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate
Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 477, 485-91 (2005).
188
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 455 (predicting that “the reform
of corporate governance practices will generally precede the reform of corporate
law, for the simple reason that governance practice is largely a matter of private
ordering that does not require legislative action”). For further information on
functional convergence, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
641 passim (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 passim (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence
and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control?,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 83 (Joseph A.
McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002).
189
Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 328, 362 (2001).
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analysis—that any convergence of national corporate governance
systems will be “slow, sporadic, and uncertain.”190 William Bratton
and Joseph McCahery also recognized the possibility of an
“improved variety of governance systems” or a “set of viable
distinctive governance systems” rather than a complete
convergence, 191 while, more recently, Franklin Gevurtz has
contended that corporate convergence through imitation and
transplant is occurring but in an incomplete and impermanent
rather than linear fashion. 192 On the other side of the spectrum,
Hansmann and Kraakman defended the convergence thesis in
subsequent writings even after the Enron scandal and the GFC,193
while additional support for the convergence thesis came from the
law and finance literature and the influential “legal origin matters”
thesis.194 Yet, subsequent “leximetric” research has challenged the
claim that there has been a significant Americanization of other
countries’ laws and shows that, despite global trends, lawmakers are
able to deviate from influential models in corporate law and
corporate governance.195

190

(1998).

Curtis J. Milhaupt, Essay, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1185

191
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 23, 30 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland,
Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002).
192
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or
a Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2011).
193
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of Corporate
Law?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 56 (Joseph
A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002);
Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745, 748 (2005).
194 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1151-52 (1998)
(concluding that the quality of legal protection of shareholders helps determine
ownership concentration).
195
See Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Corporate Governance: A Leximetric
Approach, 45 J. CORP. L. 729 passim (2010) (using leximetrics to conclude that whether
there has been convergence, divergence, or persistence of the legal rules that shape
country-level differences in corporate governance depends on the area of law);
Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder
Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990-2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 127,
160 (2015) ([A]ll legal origins now have about the same level of shareholder
protection on average . . . .”).
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Similarly, and as we have already discussed in the context of
showcasing the contribution made by the VoC school to the
corporate governance debate, a number of prominent political
theories of comparative corporate governance challenged the main
assumptions of the convergence argument. Most prominently,
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark Roe posited that the social forces
and structures that shape legal rules, including history, politics, and
ownership structures, are path dependent and will constrain the
globalized forces pushing for corporate governance convergence.196
Extending this line of thought, Reinhard Schmidt and Gerald
Spindler added the concept of complementarity to the analytical mix
of path dependence, which relates to the internal “fit” of the
institutional components of a governance system.197 Because of the
complementarity found in both insider and outsider corporate
governance systems, Schmidt and Spindler rule out a rapid
convergence towards a universally best corporate governance
system.198
While Schmidt and Spindler analyzed the aspect of
complementarity within a (national) corporate governance system,
VoC scholars such as Peter Hall and David Soskice have elaborated
path-dependent, institutional complementarities between different
sub-systems of a country’s or a region’s political economy.199 By
distinguishing, as we discussed, 200 the political economies of
developed Western countries as between Liberal Market Economies
(LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), they were able
to paint an arguably more differentiated picture of what actually
marked up the landscape of corporate governance and its attendant
196
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129-32 (1999).
197
Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate
Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’L FIN. 311, 318, 325 (2002) (introducing the
concept of complementarity as a reason for path dependence).
198
Id. at 325-28 (demonstrating through multifactor analysis of
complementarity why it is unlikely that individual innovators and national
politicians could bring about a change of corporate governance systems which
would ultimately lead to convergence).
199
See Hall & Soskice, supra note 62. An important, earlier contribution to this
field was J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors
and Social Systems of Production, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS
OF INSTITUTIONS 1 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997).
200 See supra Part II.
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trials and tribulations. Importantly, they inquired how firms
coordinate their activities in five sub-systems of the political
economy, including industrial relations, vocational training and
education, corporate governance, inter-firm relationships and
employees and, based on their findings, argued that the level of
coordination between the different sub-systems would make
national corporate governance systems (especially CMEs) resilient
to convergence.201 The VoC approach has been criticized on various
grounds, including for concentrating too much on firms while
paying less attention to other actors such as the state,202 for focusing
only on Western, developed countries, 203 for lumping together
common law countries,204 and for disregarding the tension between
path dependency and the need for a particular variety (or subvariety) of capitalism to adapt to changes in markets and
products.205 Despite these criticisms, VoC had a profound impact
on the larger debates around the then still very undecided fate of
national political economies under the threat of what Joseph Stiglitz
famously called “The Roaring Nineties.” 206 With a focus on
institutional diversity, the VoC scholars explicitly addressed the
embedded, historically-grown socio-political and cultural national
corporate governance systems and thus underlined the relevance of
competitive advantages of national differences.207 Based on these
comprehensive findings, which themselves were the result of
extensive empirical and quantitative work, they argued against a
See Hall & Soskice, supra note 62, at 62-66.
On the central role that the state still plays in political economies such as
France, see Vivien A. Schmidt, French Capitalism Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety
of Capitalism, 32 ECON. & SOC’Y 526, 531-32 (2003).
203 But see Andreas Nölke & Simone Claar, Varieties of Capitalism in Emerging
Economies, 81/82 TRANSFORMATION 33, 33-34 (2013) (noting that the VoC inspired
approach has been extended to emerging economies).
204
But see Michael A. Witt & Gregory Jackson, Varieties of Capitalism and
Institutional Comparative Advantage: A Test and Reinterpretation, 47 J. INT’L BUS. STUD.
778, 797 (2016) (suggesting that at least two different institutional configurations
are associated with comparative advantage in the presence of radical innovation).
205
See Gilson, supra note 188.
206
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S
MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2003).
207
See, e.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 62, at 56 (arguing that “[c]omparative
institutional advantages tend to render companies less mobile than theories that do
not acknowledge them imply,” thereby calling into question the assumptions of
globalization).
201
202

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3

2020]

New Geographies of Corporate Governance

113

one-way convergence towards the Anglo-American marketoriented corporate governance system.208
While the convergence/divergence conundrum clearly left its
mark on the scholarly and policy debates in the late 1990s and early
2000s, being furthermore associated with efforts to “export” AngloAmerican corporate governance principles internationally, a slightly
different debate began to unfold on the European front, which
would soon dominate scholarly discussions for years to come. Just
as “quite” in the United States means something else than “quite” in
the United Kingdom, federalism, harmonization and regulatory
competition meant very different things in the United States and the
European Union. From an early point onwards, the varied history
of European corporate law exposed the challenges of
harmonization,209 given the extensive differences in locally rooted
and historically grown and consolidated company law systems
across Europe. 210 In comparison, this constellation looked very
different from the history and experience of U.S.-style regulatory
competition. 211 While the polarities between the United States
208
See, e.g., Hall & Gingerich, supra note 82, at 478-480 (empirically showing
that despite some liberalization of institutional practices CMEs have not converged
towards LMEs).
209
The failed attempts to harmonize board structures in the EU with the 5th
company law directive, the tumultuous history of the Takeover Directive, and the
European Company Statute, respectively, tell an important story in that regard. See,
e.g., Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization between Convergence and Varieties
of Capitalism (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 355, 2017),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/3552017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6HM-DJ9U]; Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and
National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV.
867 passim (2004).
210
See Antoine Réberioux, European Style of Corporate Governance at the
Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 111, 117-20
(2002) (exploring the main competing economic theories that explain international
diversity in corporate governance); see also GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER
ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL
PRIVATE LAW 181, 196 (2010) (noting that the intricate embeddedness of regulatory
innovation in locally defined governance structures alongside their integration in
transnationally unfolding rule-making processes is characteristic of the current
regulatory landscape in corporate governance).
211
See, e.g., David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating
Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the
European Communities, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 456 (1991) (highlighting the
institutional differences behind the regulatory systems in United States and
European Communities).
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pattern of competitive federalism and the different conflict of laws
regimes of the EU Member States had occupied scholars for a long
time, the debate over the exportability of U.S.-style regulatory
competition took a different turn in light of the European Court of
Justice’s case law on the free movement of companies. Following
the Centros line of cases around the turn of the 21st century, the
introduction of a Delaware-type form of inter-jurisdictional
competition among EU Member States’ company laws
metamorphosed into a pressing actuality, with severe repercussions
on EU Member States’ diversity.212 As a result, European corporate
law and European corporate governance tended to be squeezed into
an uncomfortable either-or position with choices between
harmonization and regulatory competition or between shareholder
primacy and stakeholder theories, largely reflecting the tension
between the market integration project, on the one hand, and the
ambition of (certain) Member States to boost national champions, on
the other.213
c. “Scholarly Bind Three”: Private Ordering and the Binary
Distinction between “Hard” and “Soft” Law
There can be no doubt that, along with its impact on national,
international, and comparative debates about the purpose of the
corporation and corporate governance reforms, the law and
212
Simon Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism
Versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros,
2 CAMBRIDGE. Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 231, 232 (1999-2000) (arguing harmonization
standards are needed to provide the conditions under which diversity is
preserved). But see John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation
Versus Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369, 370 (2005) (arguing
regulatory competition between Member States’ company laws is a better way to
stimulate the development of appropriate legal rules than is the European
legislative process).
213
For an insightful, retrospective assessment, see Stefano Lombardo,
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law. Where Do We Stand Twenty Years
After Centros? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 452, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392502
[https://perma.cc/S88V-T26C]. With regard to the “Volkswagen” landmark
decision by the European Court of Justice, see Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The
ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of
Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027 passim (2007).
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economics approach to corporate governance provided strong
support for the argument regarding the superiority of private and
decentralized methods of internal governance at the micro
(individual firm) level over public policy. One of the principal
normative achievements of the “private ordering” or
“contractarian” theory of the firm is the treatment of corporate law
and corporate governance regulation as contractually determinable
and market facilitative private law, rather than public regulatory
law.214 The explicitly anti-regulatory bias fit the time and did not
have much trouble prevailing in policy and scholarly circles, as
corporate governance regulation displayed an increasing reliance on
market-based, privately created best practice norms, codes,
standards, and recommendations. The proliferation of national as
well as company-specific corporate governance codes, 215 codes of
conduct, 216 statements of “good” or “recommended” practices by
international organizations, 217 and, more recently, stewardship
codes for institutional investors218 testify to the growing consensus
around a more indirect approach to “regulating” corporate actors by
enabling, encouraging, and nudging them to use their internal
structures and processes, particularly the board of directors and,
more recently, the shareholders to formulate self-regulatory regimes
rather than turning to “the state” to issue strong commands.
Where did it start? Arguably, the UK Cadbury Report219 is seen
as an important milestone in the more recent history of corporate
governance regulation. Shortly after being issued, the Cadbury
214
For a famous and biting critique, see William W. Bratton Jr., The “Nexus of
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 410-11 (1989).
215
See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good
Governance Worldwide: What is the Trigger?, 25 ORG. STUD. 415, 419 (2004) (detailing
the exponential rise of national corporate governance codes in the 1990s).
216 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of
“Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 617
passim (2011) (advancing various arguments that corporate codes feature functions,
structures, and institutions of genuine constitutions).
217
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principlescorporate-governance.htm [https://perma.cc/UD27-2VLN].
218
See infra Part IV.
219
ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
1992,
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9EC-S45R].
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Report resonated around the world, triggering a true surge of
comparable “regulatory” initiatives.220 Corporate governance codes
have developed out of the interactions of governmental or quasigovernmental entities, stock exchanges, and business, academic and
industry communities, and investor-related groups as a response to
corporate catastrophes, 221 and have proliferated across more than
sixty countries recommending detailed governance frameworks
mostly for publicly-listed companies. 222 Even though they vary
considerably in terms of content, legal status, and origin, a
distinctive feature of these codes is their extensive resort to
(perceivably, at least) non-statist, non-binding “soft-law”
techniques, which provide flexibility and responsiveness to
individual, firm-level circumstances while keeping regulating detail
to a minimum. This feature is prominently manifested in the 2018
UK Corporate Governance Code (and its previous versions), the
enforcement of which rests on the investor-driven practice of
“comply or explain.” 223 The “comply or explain” enforcement
mode, in turn, rests upon two pillars: sufficiently high-quality
disclosure by companies and an informed evaluation of the
perceived compliance or non-compliance by the companies’
shareholders (especially institutional ones) and the market.
220
See Cally Jordan, Cadbury Twenty Years On, 58 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (2013)
(exploring how the Cadbury Report quickly gained worldwide popularity and its
effects on international corporate governance initiatives).
221
See HOLLY J. GREGORY & ROBERT T. SIMMELKJAER, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER
STATES 285 (2002) (providing a comparative analysis of corporate governance codes
in the fifteen EU member states), https://ecgi.global/code/comparative-studycorporate-governance-codes-relevant-european-union-and-its-member-states
[https://perma.cc/2KWU-YX6T]. See also Dimity Kingsford Smith, Governing the
Corporation: The Role of Soft Regulation, 35 UNSW L.J. 378 (2012) (exploring the role
of soft regulation in the development of corporate governance codes); Aidan
O’Dwyer, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis: The Role of Shareholders in
Monitoring the Activities of the Board, 5 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 112 (2014)
(discussing the foundations of UK corporate governance along with the
developments that have come about since the 2008 financial crisis).
222
The European Corporate Governance Institute maintains a list of most of
the corporate governance codes that have been released worldwide. Codes, ECGI,
https://ecgi.global/content/codes [https://perma.cc/HZN9-9ZT4].
223
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 1-3
(2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/M4HR-L735].
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“Comply or explain” is, therefore, an “obligation” to shareholders
(not regulators) to make an informed evaluation as to whether noncompliance is justified given the company’s particular
circumstances and then to take action in cases of non-conformance
or poor explanations. While much ink has been spilled on the
effectiveness of the “comply or explain” system with many good
arguments on both sides,224 what is less explored is the degree of
coerciveness of this investor-determinable norm production and
enforcement, which is generally assumed to be entirely voluntary.
Prior literature notably speaks in binary terms by distinguishing
between “soft” and “hard” law and mostly associates the former
with informal, non-binding norms generated through non-statist
processes.225 The lack of any state involvement in initiation and/or
monitoring and enforcement is for most seen as critical to “soft”
norms, and has sometimes raised concerns about the legitimacy of
non-state-made, “soft,” law.226 Others emphasize the nature of legal
norms and equate “soft” law with voluntary, non-binding rules.227
This presumable lack of express legalization of “soft” law (namely
224 See, e.g., Andrew Keay, Comply or Explain in Corporate Governance Codes: In
Need of Greater Regulatory Oversight?, 34 LEGAL STUD. 279 (2014) (weighing the
benefits and costs of introducing a hard regulatory enforcement scheme for
corporate directors). For an analysis of the introduction of the comply-or-explain
rule in the German Stock Corporation Law, see David Seidl, Paul Sanderson & John
Roberts, Applying ‘Comply or Explain’: Conformance with Codes of Corporate Governance
in the UK and Germany (Ctr. for Bus. Rsch., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No.
389,
2009),
https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-forbusiness-research/downloads/working-papers/wp389.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZPR-QVWA].
225
See, e.g., Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European
Community, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 197, 198 (Stephen Martin ed., 1994);
Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Law: An Analytical Framework, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 400 (2009) (developing an analytical framework for comparing norms
on different positions along the continuum of “hard” and “soft” law).
226
See Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 17172 (1996) (asserting it is not all that obvious that states can conclude agreements yet
at the same time deny that such agreements would amount to hard law).
227
Snyder, supra note 225, at 198. See also Francis Snyder, Governing Economic
Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 334, 342 (1999) (“In
the governance of global economic networks, however, both soft law and legally
binding norms, or ‘hard law’, are important. Indeed, the relationship between hard
law and soft law has long been controversial, and today it is one of the most
interesting—and difficult—questions currently raised by the governance of
globalization.”).
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its alleged lack of enforceability) has been the key dimension
between the early corporate governance codes and best practices, on
the one hand, and traditional company law, on the other, with the
latter being highly regulatory in nature, containing many
mandatory rules. 228 Crucially, the binary distinction between
“hard” and “soft” law must be seen and relativized in the context of
institutional and normative pluralism229 that has emerged from the
fundamental transformation of the regulatory state through
decentralization, privatization, and marketization. Seen against that
background, “soft” legal norms can be both weaker regulatory
instruments that might or might not be hardened at some point
through parliamentary or governmental law making230 and, simply,
alternative governance modes that complement and co-exist with
stronger, harder ones less distinguishable through an either-or but
marking choices along a continuum.231
“Soft” legal norms, whether or not they emanate from the state
or civil society, have become an important regulatory tool in
corporate governance regulation with far-reaching and often more
coercive implications than traditional regulatory theories suggest.
“Soft” corporate governance norms do not lack force and effect and
continue to raise difficult questions as to whether they can be flouted
without consequences.232 For example, a common misapprehension
228
On this dichotomy in the context of United States corporate law, see Coffee,
Jr., supra note 78 at 1653-64.
229
See Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the PostRegulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY
NORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145, 149 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur
eds., 2004).
230
See Justine Nolan, Hardening Soft Law: Are the Emerging Corporate Social
Disclosure Laws Capable of Generating Substantive Compliance with Human Rights?, 15
BRAZ. J. INT’L L. 65, 67-68 (2018) (providing an overview of some of the recent
corporate social disclosure and due diligence legislative initiatives aimed at
increasing transparency in global supply chains and illustrating how these laws are
hardening the human rights expectations of business that have previously and
predominantly been set out in soft law frameworks).
231
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 716
(2010) (“[H]ard and soft law are best seen not as binary categories but rather as
choices arrayed along a continuum.”).
232
See, e.g., Keay, supra note 224. See also Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of
Company Law? Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self Regulation, 3
136,
139-41
(2002),
JURIDIKUM
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regarding the UK Corporate Governance Code has long been that it
is an example of “private” law making or self-regulation. It’s
important to note, however, that while the code is promulgated and
administered by the Financial Reporting Council, which itself has no
statutory footing (at least for now233 ), it is still dependent on the
regulatory state, insofar as it is expressly sanctioned by the
government, through the UK’s Listing Authority, the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA). 234 Therefore, despite the apparent
voluntariness of the Code’s provisions and the market-dependency
of its enforcement, the FCA’s delegated statutory powers to enforce
the “comply or explain” obligation have a significant coercive
element. 235 This approach to corporate governance regulation is,
therefore, incorrectly described as private or self-regulation, and can
be more appropriately regarded as “associationism,” “coregulation” or as a form of “regulated autonomy,” which is
exercised by the market but is supported by state-ordered
https://www.juridikum.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ausgaben/juridikum%203-2
002.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA84-HTUM] (arguing that the different layers of
norms that can be found in the code, the recommendations, as well as the
reformulations of otherwise codified law, show that this form of norm setting
cannot be detached from its socio-legal environment).
233
The current transition from the FRC to the new regulator, the Audit,
Reporting and Governance Authority (ARGA) will be accountable to the
Parliament. JOHN KINGMAN, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL REPORTING
COUNCIL: INITIAL CONSULTATION ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2019),
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/independent-review-of-the-fin
ancial-reporting-council-initial-consultation-on-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/JX95-9CVE]. See also FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PLAN & BUDGET
2019/20, at 3-4 (May 2019), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/44ad65095fb8-4645-b945-5fcee5689290/Final-FRC-Plan-Budget-May-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6GN-D79Y].
234
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LISTING RULES, CH. 9: CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LBN9-C3RW].
235
Regarding the low degree of enforced sanctions by the FCA, see John
Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical
Assessment (Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working Paper No. 106, 2008),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133542
[https://perma.cc/UXV5-7TQZ].
By
comparison, see the regulatory practice in the context of the German Stock
Corporation Act. AKTIENGESETZ [German Stock Corporation Act] §161 (1), Sept. 6,
1965, translated in Norton Rose LLP (2016); see also Holger Fleischer, A Guide to
German Company Law for International Lawyers – Distinctive Features, Particularities,
Idiosyncrasies
3,
12
(2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597062
[https://perma.cc/H4EY-B2LW].
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regulation. 236
The occasional tendency among corporate
governance scholars 237 to overlook these implications reflects, we
believe, both an incomplete understanding of “soft” law—with
regard to its impact on individual companies and on stakeholders at
the micro (individual firm) level as well as on financial markets at
the macro level, and a more deeply rooted bias towards marketbased private ordering and against state intervention. This
overlapping of sociological, empirical markers (“how things are”)
and normative choices (“how I believe they ought to be”) constitutes
the complex institutional-symbolic space of corporate governance
that can never be fully grasped by focusing only on one aspect.
VI. THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE II: WHO AND WHERE
IS THE ARCHITECT?
Today, “corporate governance,” which for years had been
depicted as a decidedly shareholder-driven regulatory area, is being
reshaped by a comprehensive and far-reaching critique of what the
corporation is, does, and for whom it operates. 238 As part of this
renewed emphasis on the social role and purpose of the corporation,
it is being rediscovered as belonging to historically and socioculturally evolved, national corporate governance systems,
something that VoC scholars had long been demanding. This
interest in the embeddedness of the corporation in a complex
political economy is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s influential
observation of a “double movement” in modern market economies
in which laissez-faire economics result in an expansion of selfregulating markets, against which efforts ensue to (re)-embed

236 See, e.g., John Holland, Self Regulation and the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance, (1996) J. BUS. L. 127 (using case study data to conclude that considerable
“behind the scenes” efforts by companies and financial institutions to avoid
financial malpractice fraud occurs).
237
For a notable exception, see MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 168 (2013) (highlighting that the UK Corporate
Governance Code “whilst formally classifiable as non-governmental in nature
nevertheless operate[s] within the substantial shadow of the regulatory state”).
238
Lipton, supra note 68.
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market forces in social institutions. 239 But despite mounting
evidence that the corporate governance terrain continues to expand
in a significant manner in terms of its substantive scope and its
geographical relevance, there remain considerable misconceptions
and communication gaps between the conventional debate, as it
were, and the increasingly diversified camp of critics. For instance,
while the VoC approach and its refinements has made an immensely
important contribution to the sometimes too acontextual
comparative study of corporate governance, we contend that VoC’s
dominant focus on national institutional structures is ill-suited to
address the challenges posed by the significant transformation of
corporate law-making.
This transformation is marked by
substantial privatization of norm-making in corporate law and
corporate governance in recent years and has to be interpreted in
light of not only the rising influence of international actors, such as
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the World Bank, and the United Nations, but also private
actors and wider civil society in corporate governance law-making.
At the same time, while not always directly related to corporate
governance rules, the intensifying public critique directed at
Western multinationals and their entanglements with egregious
labor and human rights violations in their supply chains has been
an important factor in driving regulatory and adjudicatory
initiatives in recent years.240
239
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 138 (2d ed. 2001). See also Fred Block, Polanyi’s Double
Movement and the Reconstruction of Critical Theory, 38 REVUE INTERVENTIONS
ÉCONOMIQUES,
2008,
at
2,
https://journals.openedition.org/interventionseconomiques/274
[https://perma.cc/8FK4-HV5W] (attempting to develop a theoretical
reconstruction of Polanyi’s double movement concept by exploring its theoretical
foundations and arguing that this reconstructed theory has the potential to be an
important element of a 21st century critical theory).
240
See LAURA KNÖPFEL, CSR COMMUNICATION IN TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS
LITIGATIONS
AGAINST
PARENT
COMPANIES
2-4
(2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3311545 [https://perma.cc/PX4F-3H4P] (examining
how courts reacted to corporate social responsibility communication, which had
not been intended for a judicial context); see also Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott,
Global Supply Chains and Human Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labour and Modern Slavery
Practices,
24
AUSTRALIAN
J.
HUM.
RTS.
44
(2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1323238X.2018.1441610
[https://perma.cc/5N96-R358] (focusing on emerging legislative disclosure

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

122

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

While there is no doubt that the privatization of norm-making in
the field of corporate governance will continue to deepen, it is
important to recognize how public actors continue to both intervene
and steer but also engage with private actors in carving out a
redefined role in facilitating new relationships between corporate
actors, labor groups, and consumers.241 In addition, while corporate
law scholars began recognizing the growing prominence of “soft”
law in corporate governance regulation (especially with regard to
corporate governance codes and codes of conduct), only rarely was
the step taken to actively embrace “soft” law as a new mechanism of
regulation. 242 This is particularly important in the transnational
context, where we can observe a high degree of interpenetration
between “hard” and “soft” law and domestic and international
norms. 243 Given the increasing reliance on public monitoring,
“governance through disclosure,” and transparency, it comes as
little surprise that “soft” law norms aimed at companies’ selfimposed (or mandated) obligations to disclose their activities,

regimes as a mechanism for regulating modern slavery in supply chains and
considering how regulatory frameworks could be crafted to maximize their
effectiveness).
241
Examples of multi-stakeholder processes of negotiating and developing
regulatory reform often emerge in contexts where the relationship between state
and private actors is already shaped by the dynamics and constraints of foreign
investment. See, e.g., Manoj Dias-Abey, Using Law to Support Social Movement-Led
Collective Bargaining Structures in Supply Chains, 32 AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 123 (2019);
Ronald C. Brown, Up and Down the Multinational Corporations’ Global Labor Supply
Chains: Making Remedies that Work in China, 34 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103 (2017).
242 See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 48 (2010) (“Soft law is a novel mechanism for
constraining corporate behavior. In reconciling financial and social imperatives,
firms must consider its impact on reputational capital.”).
243 See, e.g., INT’L BAR ASS’N, REFERENCE ANNEX TO THE IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 2 (2016),
https://www.ibanet.org/LPRU/Reference-Annex-to-the-IBA-Practical-Guide.asp
x [https://perma.cc/7LCW-4VZJ] (amplifying and focusing in detail on some of
the potential implications for the legal profession of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights); John Ruggie (Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31
(Mar.
21,
2011),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/121/90/PDF/G1112190.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/F9LD-H4HG].
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earnings, as well as their labor practices, down to their subsidiaries
and contractors are more and more under public scrutiny.244
But how helpful are the categories of “hard” and “soft” law in
this context? The expansion of “soft” law into a growing number of
areas of corporate conduct prompts us to review the seemingly too
stark choice between “hard” and “soft” law. As John Ruggie, then
Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Special Secretary on Business and
Human Rights and responsible author of the Guiding Principles,245
observed: “in light of the multinationals power, authority, and
relative autonomy, the time-worn mandatory/voluntary dichotomy
inhibits rather than advances our coming to grips with the
challenges posed by corporate globalization.”246 In effect, today’s
regulatory toolbox of corporate governance does not really reflect a
neat separability of “hard” and “soft” law instruments. Instead,
contemporary governance dynamics unfold in a transnational realm
in which states, private actors, civil society groups, and a myriad of
interest groups are interacting and competing with one another. As
a result, traditional national, comparative or international law do not
yet adequately offer the necessary analytical and conceptual
categories and tools to unpack the complex regulatory landscape
which has been forming before our eyes and which is marked by a
proliferation of hybrid norm-making processes in the context of
highly specialized, sector-specific, and yet functionally structured,
spatial, de-territorialized regimes, which are not confined to
national or regional boundaries. Nation states no longer have—if
they ever did—a monopoly on regulating the way companies, both
MNCs and domestic alike, are controlled and held accountable,
while the shift from state-centered government to an increasingly
fragmented system of self-steering by public and private actors
continues.247
244
See Dhir, supra note 58, at 72 (emphasizing social disclosure as a means of
strengthening the position of human rights-conscious shareholders, rather than as
a process that will result in self-correcting behavior modification on the part of
corporate decision makers); see also Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply
Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 419, 421 (2015) (analyzing the effectiveness of using
domestic law to regulate global supply chains with respect to human rights and
labor practices).
245
Ruggie, supra note 243.
246
Ruggie, supra note 9, at 329-30.
247
GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (1997).
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Still, while the binary categorization of norms as “hard” or “soft”
remains relevant in distinguishing between different enforcement
mechanisms and with regard to the legitimacy basis that is being
claimed for a particular norm,248 it is less effective in regard to the
actual performative role played by these norms and the actors
engaged in their production.249 Corporate governance regulation,
like any other arena with a complex history and pitting competing
policies against one another, encompasses both a host of
institutional/normative and symbolic dimensions. In other words,
there is a complex relationship between the law (and the policies a
lawmaker might pursue at a given moment) and the culture which
is both shaping these policies and which has been and will be shaped
by them. 250 As such, the institutionally-regulated as well as the
symbolic-cultural spaces of corporate governance have different
material qualities: while they are shaping and are being shaped by
various public and private actors in the actual creation of new and
innovative processes of norm-generation, these spaces are also
epistemic realms which consist of self-referential discursive
processes and logics. The framing of corporate law from the
perspective of shareholder value maximization 251 can hardly
capture these materialities.
An adequate analysis of these
materialities must draw on insights by governance and regime
scholars who emphasize not only that “hard” and “soft” law are best
seen as choices along a continuum252 but also emphasize that “soft”
law can no more remain confined to rules of conduct which are

See supra Section V.c.
For a critical assessment, see Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The Deal,
Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal Order, 34 J.L. & SOC’Y 116 (2007).
250
Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 489 (2003)
(“[L]aw does not merely reflect the norms of a pre-existing culture, but is instead
itself a medium that both instantiates and establishes culture.”).
251
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4. But see Armour, Deakin &
Konzelmann, supra note 173.
252
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 436 (2000) (arguing that states face tradeoffs in
choosing levels of legalization, and that choices along this continuum of tradeoffs
determine the "hardness" of legalization, both initially and over time); Shaffer &
Pollack, supra note 231, at 716 (2010) (agreeing with the approach that hard and soft
law are best seen not as binary categories but rather as choices arrayed along a
continuum).
248
249
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believed to have no legally binding force.253 In addition, we must
acknowledge the power which is concentrated in and perpetuated
by—dominant—discursive regimes, which, as we saw in the
example of the law and economics narrative of corporate
governance, effectively create a justification framework seen as
value neutral and objective. As has been shown again and again,254
the so-called “end of history” and its related allegation of a global
triumph of shareholder value maximization “works” because its
narrow premises are hidden from view.
Meanwhile, beyond the scholarly debate around corporate law
and corporate governance, a broader, richer, and growing literature
aims at addressing the increasingly profuse normative and
regulatory mosaic that forms against the background of the state’s
changing regulatory role,255 and prompts the reconceptualization of
law and regulation through notions of transnational law,256 global
law, 257 and legal pluralism. 258 Irrespective of the terminological

253
See Klaas Hendrik Eller, Private Governance of Global Value Chains From
Within: Lessons From and for Transnational Law, 8 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 296, 301
(2017) (demonstrating that transnational law has not yet risen to the challenge of
projecting and rearranging institutional guarantees of national democratic
lawmaking beyond the state).
254 See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 169; Armour, Deakin & Konzelmann, supra note
173.
255 See Shaffer, supra note 43. See also Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of
the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1469, 1470
(2012).
256 See, e.g., PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (unpacking the notion
and concept of transnational law); Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism, 21
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2012); César Arjona, Transnational Law as an
Excuse. How Teaching Law Without the State Makes Legal Education Better (ESADE,
Working
Paper
No.
219,
2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1940274
[https://perma.cc/G88T-MZRZ].
257
See generally GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF GLOBAL LAW
(2008) (investigating, inter alia, the role of international organizations in
contributing to a global repository of commonly shared values and norms); RAFAEL
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010) (pursuing the idea of a global people as a
source and legitimate foundation of legal order that addresses humanity’s pressing
problems).
258
See Teubner, supra note 216, at 626; see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN,
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012)
(providing a comprehensive account and analysis of distinct, coexisting, and
overlapping normative orders inside and beyond national jurisdictional systems).
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debate,259 legal, social and political thinkers have been mobilizing a
rich array of approaches to address the changing face of legal
(private and public) regulation in globally integrated markets.
Arguably, corporate governance regulation has been a latecomer to
this dynamic scholarly discussion of the dynamic nature of private
regulation, which has mainly focused on other non-public law
fields, including consumer protection, labor regulation, finance,
banking, human rights, environmental regulation, accounting
standards, and e-commerce.260
The suggestion of thinking of corporate governance as a
transnational regulatory field and of approaching it from a legal
pluralist perspective 261 builds on the insights of VoC and
comparative political economy scholars but reads them against the
background of a longer-standing critique of the all-too-often
assumed exclusionary status of law as originating in and from the
state. In contrast, when we study corporate governance through the
lens of transnational legal methodology and legal pluralism with a
focus on the actual actors, norms, and processes that make up the
field, the intricate relations between formal and informal, “public”
and “private,” “hard” and “soft” law norms which make up the
multiple and spatialized political economies of corporate
governance regulation today become visible.262 The transnational
dimension of public and private actors, the newly emerging legal
and social forms of norms and the multi-level rule-setting processes
259
For an insightful critique, see Frank J. Garcia, Globalization’s Law:
Transnational, Global or Both?, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 2015 at 31 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed.,
2016).
260
For a transnational discourse of other areas of private law, see Fabrizio
Cafaggi, The Many Features of Transnational Private Rule-Making: Unexplored
Relationships Between Custom, Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation, 36 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 875 (2015).
261
See, e.g., Zumbansen, supra note 61, at 248; Peer Zumbansen, Transnational
Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141 passim (2010).
262 See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a
Global Context, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 passim (2013) (exploring the
challenges facing the theory of transnational governance today); Peer Zumbansen,
The Constitutional Itch: Transnational Private Regulatory Governance and the Woes of
Legitimacy, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL
AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 84 (Michael A. Helfand ed., 2015) (discussing how
developments in privacy law “address the normative challenges of transnational
private regulatory governance”).
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radicalize the “semi-autonomous” nature 263 of transnational
corporate governance regulation and reveal the tension between
binding state-law, on the one hand, and market-based, but still not
necessarily non-binding “law,” on the other.264
It is against this background that earlier scholarly depictions of
the traditional corporate governance debates of the past decades
need to be read more critically. We suggest revitalizing the idea of
the “embeddedness” of corporations within the social and political
system, albeit under present-day conditions.265 In that regard, we
have to acknowledge the challenges that arise for a project which
seeks to track and trace the corporation in a complex, historical,
cultural, political, and legal context. This inevitably leads to difficult
questions of sociology in a context that sociologists such as Niklas
Luhmann and others266 have called the “world society”—namely a
world which is both multi-level and trans-territorialized and whose
defining feature is the radical fragmentation of systems across
different governing rationalities.267 While being partially grounded
in the VoC story of corporate law and corporate governance as
regulatory regimes that are shaped by the national, historically
263
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720 (1973).
264 See Jaakko Salminen, Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance Mechanisms:
Conceptualizing Fragmented and Globalized Production as Collectively Governed Entities,
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 710 (2016) (using the term “contract-boundaryspanning governance” to refer to “the increasingly sophisticated mechanisms that
are used by private actors to govern chains or networks of contracts for a particular
purpose”); Eller, supra note 246; Zumbansen, supra note 55, at 66.
265
See Sabine Frerichs, Transnational Law and Economic Sociology, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen ed., forthcoming
2020); Sabine Frerichs, Re-embedding Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: A Polanyian Case
for the Economic Sociology of Law, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE
POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 65 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke
eds., 2011); see generally POLANYI, supra note 239; Robert Boyer & J. Rogers
Hollingsworth, From National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (Robert Boyer
& J. Rogers Hollingworth eds., 1997).
266
See Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8 INT’L J. GEN.
SYST. 131, 131-38 (1982); see also John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas &
Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 144 passim
(1997); CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 210.
267
See Peer Zumbansen, The Next ‘Great Transformation’? The Double Movement
in Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation, in KARL
POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS
181 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).
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evolving political economies of their times, our focus on the
“transnationally embedded firm” goes beyond the VoC account.
Because we place the corporation in the context of domestic and
transnational state transformation with its attendant rise of diverse
and hybrid forms of norm creation and implementation, on the one
hand, and in the context of a globally financializing economy,268 on
the other, corporate governance is for us always “already”
transnational—that is, it is embedded in processes of regulatory
transformation and market dynamics which are never fully confined
by the state and its territory.
This, then, is the main reason why a corporate governance
analysis that alludes to the connections between the corporation and
global capital markets but reduces the political analysis of the
corporation to the juxtaposition of shareholders and stakeholders is
not only misleading, but, in the end, unproductive. In both respects,
much of the current analysis of corporate governance transposes the
corporation into a realm that is simultaneously abstract and
politically charged. By contrast, we side with those scholars who
insist on and invest in the messy, detailed work of political economy
analysis as it promises to show how the financialized corporation
today is both the object and subject in a complex and changing
physical, geographical legal environment.269 The political economy
analysis allows us to study corporate governance not as a distinct
field of ideological warfare over directors’ duties or a corporation’s
“social responsibilities,” but in the context of the rise and ensuing
transformation of the “post-regulatory,” globalizing state since the
1980s. While any conversation about the corporation and about
corporate law carries the seed of a larger investigation into the
relationship between state and market in it, it is really only when we
take the concrete political economy changes into account, which
shape our engagement with corporations, that we can hope to arrive
268
See Ronald Dore, Financialization of the Global Economy, 17 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 1097, 1101-02 (2008) (“This vast superstructure of gambling transactions is
built on the needs of the producers and consumers of goods and non-financial
services for (i) credit, (ii) insurance against uncertainty, and (iii) profitable ways of
using their savings.”).
269
See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 168, passim (discussing the embeddedness of
corporations and corporate governance systems); THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer
Zumbansen eds., 2011) (providing a detailed discussion of the embeddedness of
corporations and corporate governance systems).
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at a more comprehensive understanding of what corporate
governance is really about. And it is at that point that the
inseparability between corporate law and these ominously “bigger”
questions of democracy, equality, and justice show themselves.270
When we speak of corporate governance as part of a national
discourse on how corporations should be run271, we believe that it
should become normal to consider the very wide range of social
constituencies that make up the stakeholders of a corporation—
rather than having to fight for an occasional, exceptional
acknowledgement of the corporation’s impact on and exclusion of
vulnerable interests as has long been the main orientation of CSR
work. 272 When we speak of multinational or transnational
corporations and of corporate governance as a transnational site of
regulatory conflict we want to direct attention to the complex
interplay between a corporation’s locally embedded stakeholders,
including respective host governments, on the one hand, and an
immensely diversified, as well as spatially diffused, transnational
set of claimants of rights towards and in the corporation, on the
other. In both respects, we argue that the corporation should no
longer be treated as a token in a relatively clean-cut ideological
struggle between “state” and “market” à la Friedrich Hayek, Milton
Friedman, or Mark Zuckerberg, but rather as a crucial
organizational platform and policy arena which is rife with
regulatory potential and vivacity.

270
See Wolfgang Merkel, Is Capitalism Compatible with Democracy?, 8
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 109, 128 (2014),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12286-014-0199-4
[https://perma.cc/5AMN-V5W6]; DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX:
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011).
271
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 68.
272
See Charles Eesley & Michael J. Lenox, Firm Responses to Secondary
Stakeholder Action, 27 STRAT. MGT. J. 765, 765 (2006) (“While firms are not
contractually obligated to these secondary stakeholders, anecdotal evidence
suggests that these groups can bring pressures to bear to induce firms to respond
to stakeholder requests. In particular, outside stakeholder groups can engage in a
set of actions such as protests, civil suits, and letter-writing campaigns to advance
their interests. These actions can provide strong incentives for firms to meet
stakeholder demands . . . .”).
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VII. THE EMERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL THEORY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDER
STEWARDSHIP AS CASE IN POINT
As is often said, verba docent, exempla trahunt. As such, we shall
now turn to our case study. The recent regulatory initiative around
the concept of shareholder stewardship, which we will now focus
on, is illustrative of the fundamentally transnational nature of the
normative evolution of corporate governance today. The meteoric
growth in the presence of institutional investors—such as pension
funds, open-end mutual funds, index funds and hedge funds—in
global equity markets in the last three decades and changing
corporate governance practices (ranging from informal forms of
shareholder engagement to more aggressive forms of hedge fund
activism 273 ) prompted the resurrection of the old corporate
governance scholarly dogma of “shareholders as monitors.” 274
Inspired by law and economics theories, scholars put forward the
idea that institutional shareholders, especially pension funds, have
the skills and incentives to engage in efforts to influence or discipline
managerial activity. 275
Post-GFC, however, such benign
assumptions with regard to an effective monitoring function
attributed to institutional shareholders have not always fared so
well. While some were concerned with the purported ability of
institutional investors, especially hedge funds, to influence
273 See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism:
Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459 (2013) (providing original empirical
data on activist hedge fund campaigns outside the United States and dismantling
some of the key myths surrounding hedge fund activism). For a recent account of
shareholder activism, see Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of
Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2019).
274
For an analysis of the changed nature of shareholders in recent decades,
see Dionysia Katelouzou, Reflections on the Nature of the Public Corporation in an Era
of Shareholder Activism and Stewardship, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 117 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin Petrin,
eds., 2017).
275 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor
as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 passim (1991); Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 127. Note, however, that team production theorists and those who view
directors as stewards do not see the role of shareholder monitoring as being
essential to the health of a company’s corporate governance. See, e.g., Blair & Stout,
supra note 130; James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Toward a
Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20 (1997).
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companies at their own benefit, 276 others have been pressing the
need to address investors’ short-termism and myopia as well as the
challenges posed by the increasing equity intermediation.277 This
transformed the prevailing narrative relating to the corporate
governance role of institutional shareholders,278 and currently it is
widely accepted, especially in policy circles, that institutional
shareholders’ engagement is a desirable corporate governance
attribute only when it ensures long-term returns for both
beneficiaries (investment management) and shareholders (corporate
governance) and advances social responsibility.279
It is within this ideological and institutional framework that
post-GFC corporate governance reforms aimed at encouraging
institutional shareholders to actively engage with their investee
companies while promoting long-term corporate performance and
becoming active “stewards” have emerged. Inaugurated by Sir
David Walker in his 2009 review of corporate governance in UK
banks and other financial institutions,280 and manifested in the UK
Stewardship Code, (hereinafter UK Code) introduced in 2010 and
revised in 2012 and 2020, 281 shareholder stewardship refers to
276
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1283-92 (2008) (portraying the activist minority shareholders
as “conflicted” ones and proposing a widening of fiduciary duties so that they
apply to activist minority shareholders).
277 See, e.g., Alan Dignam, The Future of Shareholder Democracy in the Shadow of
the Financial Crisis, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 653 (2013). But see Joseph McCahery,
Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance
Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2915 (2016) (reporting recent
findings in support of the view that shareholder activism is not driven by shortterm myopic investors).
278
For one of the competing narratives about shareholders, see Jennifer G.
Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 497, 506-13 (2018).
279
On the dualistic nature of investment stewardship as consisting of both
corporate governance and investment management elements, see Dionysia
Katelouzou, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Path to
Enlightened Stewardship (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
280
WALKER, supra note 149.
281
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012) [hereinafter
UK CODE 2012], https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZJ8-RFSA]. For the 2020 version, see FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL,
THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2020) [hereinafter UK CODE 2020],
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87
/Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKS8-VN4C].
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constructive shareholder engagement and monitoring of companies
on the part of asset managers and asset owners for the long-term
interests of their beneficiaries, their investee companies, and society
as a whole. This idea that institutional investors should behave as
long-term oriented “stewards” has caught on globally. Ten years
after the launch of the landmark UK Code, stewardship codes can
be found in a number of other countries in Europe, e.g. Denmark,282
Italy,283 the Netherlands,284 Norway285 and Switzerland,286 and as a
basis for the amended EU Shareholder Rights Directive 2017 (SRD

282
COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP CODE (2016) [hereinafter
CODE],
DANISH
https://corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/erst_247_opsaetning_af_anb
efalinger_for_aktivt_ejerskab_uk_2k8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG3U-VMPX].
283
ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016) (It.) [hereinafter
ITALIAN
CODE],
https://www.assogestioni.it/sites/default/files/docs/principi_ita_stewardship0
72019.pdf [https://perma.cc/958Y-H895].
284
EUMEDION, DUTCH STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018) [hereinafter DUTCH CODE],
https://www.eumedion.nl/nl/public/kennisbank/best-practices/2017-09-consul
tatiedocument-stewardship-code.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ5G-TPQE].
285
VERDIPAPIRFONDENES FORENING [NORWEGIAN FUND & ASSET MANAGER
ASS’N], BRANSJEANBEFALING FOR MEDLEMMENE I VERDIPAPIRFONDENES FORENING:
UTØVELSE AV EIERSKAP [THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATION ON
EXERCISE
OF
OWNERSHIP]
(2020)
[hereinafter
NORWEGIAN
CODE],
https://vff.no/assets/Bransjeanbefaling-ut%C3%B8velse-av-eierskap-januar-2020
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KML2-ZAEP].
286
SWISS ASS’N OF PENSION FUND PROVIDERS, ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GOVERNING THE EXERCISING OF PARTICIPATION RIGHTS IN
PUBLIC
LIMITED
COMPANIES
(2013)
[hereinafter
SWISS
CODE],
https://swissinvestorscode.ch/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Richtlinien_16012
013_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVD6-75PC].
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II), 287 but also as far as Australia, 288 Brazil, 289 Canada, 290 Japan, 291
Hong Kong, 292 India, 293 Kenya, 294 Korea, 295 Malaysia, 296
See SRD II, supra note 52.
In Australia two different industry bodies have issued stewardship codes,
one for asset managers and another for asset owners. See FIN. SERVS. COUNCIL (FSC),
FSC STANDARD 23: PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND ASSET STEWARDSHIP
(2017) [hereinafter FSC CODE], https://www.fsc.org.au/web-page-resources/fscstandards/1522-23s-internal-governance-and-asset-stewardship
[https://perma.cc/LF96-8D67]; AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPERANNUATION INV.
(ACSI), AUSTRALIAN ASSET OWNER STEWARDSHIP CODE (2018) [hereinafter ACSI
2018],
https://acsi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/AAOSC_The_Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF52-E6L9].
289
ASSOCIAÇÃO DE INVESTIDORES NO MERCADO DE CAPITAIS, AMEC
STEWARDSHIP
CODE
(2016)
[hereinafter
AMEC
CODE],
https://en.amecbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Amec-StewardshipCode-Final-Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KFG-DLY4].
290
CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES (2017)
[hereinafter
CANADIAN
CODE],
https://www.ccgg.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Stewardship-Principles-2019-update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQL9-8Q8E].
291
COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
“JAPAN’S
STEWARDSHIP
CODE”
(2017),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20170529/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y8B-U4ZX]. The Code was amended in 2020, see COUNCIL OF
EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS “JAPAN’S STEWARDSHIP CODE” (2020) [hereinafter JAPAN CODE],
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/20200324/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RGE-TX5L].
292
SEC. AND & FUTURES COMM’N, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP (2016)
[hereinafter
HONG
KONG
CODE],
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Principles%20of%20Responsible%2
0Ownership_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/37KZ-38XJ].
293
In India, three stewardship codes each with a different scope have been
introduced. See Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India,
Guidelines
on
Stewardship
Code
for
Insurers
in
India,
IRDA/F&A/GDL/CMP/059/03/2017 (Issued on March 20, 2017) (amended in
2020); Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PRFDA), Common
Stewardship Code, PFRDA/2018/01/PF/01 (Issued on May 4, 2018) [hereinafter
PFRDA],
https://www.pfrda.org.in/writereaddata/links/circular%20common%20stewardship%20code%2004-05-186ec9a3b4-566b-4881-b879-c5bf0
b9e448a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XUE-TDUY]; Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), Stewardship Code for all Mutual Funds and all Categories of AIFs, in
Relation to Their Investment in Listed Equities, CIR/CFD/CMD1/168/2019
(Issued
on
December
24,
2019)
[hereinafter
SEBI],
https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/dec-2019/stewardship-code-for-all-mu
tual-funds-and-all-categories-of-aifs-in-relation-to-their-investment-in-listed-equit
ies_45451.html [https://perma.cc/R6PR-QRW6].
287
288
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Singapore,297 South Africa,298 Thailand,299 Taiwan,300 and the United
States, 301 and advocated globally by the International Corporate
Governance Network (ICGN), 302 and other regional investor
294
CAP. MKTS. AUTH., THE STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
CODE],
https://www.manifest.co.uk/wp(2017)
[hereinafter
KENYA
content/uploads/2017/06/Stewardship-Code_for-Institutional-Investors-Gazette
d.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G4V-N9EQ].
295
KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE COUNCIL, KOREA STEWARDSHIP CODE: PRINCIPLES
ON THE STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2016)
[hereinafter
KOREA
CODE],
http://sc.cgs.or.kr/eng/about/sc.jsp
[https://perma.cc/3MJ7-WZ2G].
296
MINORITY S’HOLDER WATCHDOG GRP. & SEC. COMM’N MALAYSIA, MALAYSIAN
CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2014) [hereinafter MALAYSIA CODE],
https://www.sc.com.my/api/documentms/download.ashx?id=9f4e32d3-cb97-4f
f5-852a-6cb168a9f936 [https://perma.cc/GN8M-PN7G].
297
STEWARDSHIP ASIA, SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
INVESTORS
(2016)
[hereinafter
SINGAPORE
CODE],
http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/2020-09/Section%202%
20-%20SSP%20%28Full%20Document%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5XE-5VB4]. In
October 2018, Stewardship Asia introduced the first-of-its-kind stewardship code
for family owners. See STEWARDSHIP ASIA, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY
BUSINESSES,
http://www.stewardshipasia.com.sg/sites/default/files/202009/SPFB-brochure-0913.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4Y-7PP7]. For an in-depth
analysis of the complexities of Singapore-style stewardship, see Dan W. Puchniak
& Samantha S. Tang, Singapore’s Puzzling Embrace of Shareholder Stewardship: A
Successful Secret, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (2020).
298
INST. OF DIRS. S. AFR., THE CODE FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA
(2011)
[hereinafter
CRISA],
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/crisa/crisa_19_july
_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HDH-CCD6].
299
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE CODE FOR INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
(2017)
[hereinafter
THAILAND
CODE],
https://www.sec.or.th/cgthailand/EN/Documents/ICode/ICodeBookEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49XV-4GE7].
300
TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
(2016),
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/static/stewardship_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HZ43-DUX5]. The Principles were amended in 2020, see
TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2020)
[hereinafter
TAIWAN
CODE],
https://cgc.twse.com.tw/docs/Revision%20of%20Stewardship%20Principles%20
for%20Institutional%20Investors-20200810.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QL8-XGT8].
301
INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS (2017), https://ecgi.global/code/stewardship-framework-institutionalinvestors-2017 [https://perma.cc/4G5Z-2D8H].
302
INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK (ICGN), ICGN GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP
PRINCIPLES
(2016)
[hereinafter
IGCN
CODE],
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pd
f [https://perma.cc/KBY3-M83C].
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associations, such as the European Fund and Asset Management
Association.303 This gradual internationalization, and at the same
time fragmentation, of shareholder stewardship as a body of “soft”
law for institutional investors has led to a substantial but still far
from comprehensive body of literature in recent years, focusing
primarily on the effectiveness of the inaugural UK Code and its
exportability to other jurisdictions. 304 Here, we examine the
development of the law of shareholder stewardship under the lens
of transnational regulatory governance, focusing on four key issues
which we believe are critical for norm-creation:
functions,
authorship, nature and enforcement.
In general, stewardship codes are relatively short collections of
principles and best practices that are accompanied by
recommendations and suggestions directed to institutional
investors (mainly asset owners and asset managers) and, by
extension, to service providers, or in some cases, to the lawmaker.305
They concern the corporate governance role of investment
institutions and asset managers, including engagement and
monitoring of investee companies (corporate governance aspects) as
well as their responsibilities towards the ultimate investors (whether
pension fund beneficiaries, mutual fund investors, insurance
beneficiaries or hedge fund investors). This can include strategies to
avoid conflicts of interests as well as reporting duties (investment
management aspects).306 Coming into existence with the 2010 UK
303
EUR. FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N (EFAMA), EFAMA STEWARDSHIP CODE,
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSET MANAGERS’ MONITORING OF, VOTING IN, ENGAGEMENT WITH
INVESTEE
COMPANIES
(2018)
[hereinafter
EFAMA
CODE],
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/EFAMA%
20Stewardship%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5MB-PWFF].
304 See, e.g., David William Roberts, Note, Agreement in Principle: A Compromise
for Activist Shareholders from the UK Stewardship Code, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 543,
549-561 (2015).
305
See, e.g., ICGN Code, supra note 302, at 7.
306
While stewardship was initially developed as a corporate governance
concern aimed at transforming “rationally apathetic” institutional investors into
actively engaged shareholders, stewardship had important investment
management aspects from the outset as many stewardship codes’ principles are
dealing with the relationships between the investors and their beneficiaries,
including conflicts of interests and transparency. These investment management
aspects are becoming more pronounced now as stewardship codes increasingly
promote ESG and interests beyond shareholder value maximization. See
Katelouzou, supra note 279.
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Code, stewardship codes espoused investor-led governance as a
positive regulatory mechanism. For instance, one of the key
objectives of the first two versions of the UK Code, which traces back
to the 2010 Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors of the
since dissolved Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC Code),307
is to promote “the long term success of companies in such a way that
the ultimate providers of capital also prosper.”308 Such an objective
reflects the rationale whereby “shareholders” function “as
monitors.”309 Meanwhile, the (rebuttable) assumption is that such
monitoring of corporate affairs by institutional investors should not
only improve the governance and performance of investee
companies, but should also assist in the efficient operation of the
markets while strengthening the credibility of the market economy
as a whole. But the objectives of stewardship codes are more
perplexing. Shareholder stewardship (perhaps optimistically)
conceptualizes investors as performing a two-fold function: (1) a
monitoring (corporate governance) function promoting long-term
shareholder value and broader stakeholder welfare; and (2) an
accountability function protecting the interests of the investors’ clients
and ultimate investors (investment management) as well as the
shareholders and stakeholders of their investee companies
(corporate governance). Under the spell of this so-called investor
paradigm, 310 which dovetails with the theory of “universal

307
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION ON A STEWARDSHIP CODE FOR
INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
(2010),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/frc_stewardship_code
_consultation_jan2010.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Q9CQ-NLE2].
308
UK CODE 2012, supra note 281, at 1.
309
It is noteworthy, however, that the current 2020 UK Code defines
stewardship as “the responsible allocation, management and oversight of capital to
create long-term for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for the
economy, the environment and society” and therefore prioritizes the investment
management perspective of stewardship to the corporate governance one. See UK
CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4.
310 See Katelouzou, supra note 274, at 122 (“Within this paradigm, institutional
investors are expected to act . . . as a monitoring mechanism promoting shareholder value maximization and . . . as an accountability mechanism protecting the
interests of other shareholders and the economy as a whole through the promotion
of shareholder stewardship.”).
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owners”, 311 the key tenets of the institutions’ investment
management and corporate governance functions and how they
relate to institutions’ long-term liabilities and long term corporate
performance are regarded as blessed by a broader public interest in
the creation of social value, beyond the maximization of profits.
Clearly, the (perhaps) magic regulatory formula of stewardship is
aimed at protecting the private interests of ultimate clients and
beneficiaries, while at the same time promoting long-term corporate
governance and sustainability coalescing shareholder with
stakeholder interests and private with public interests.
On a substantive level, this important institutional characteristic
of stewardship codes is exemplified in their corresponding regard
for public policy concerns, which are extraneous to considerations
of shareholder welfare. Even though there are differences in terms
of the specific content, authorship, and nature across the various
stewardship codes,312 they all reflect the view that engagement by
institutional investors is an enforcer of good corporate governance,
while they recognize that powers come with responsibilities at both
the investment management and corporate governance levels,
thereby, tapping into a major problem with increasing solicitude for
shareholders, namely the rise of financialization and short-term
shareholder value processes at the expense of other stakeholders.313
In addition, all the current twenty-three national stewardship codes
link the interests of ultimate investors with those of the stakeholders
of the investee companies, despite variations in emphasis,
substantive details, and context. 314 Further, the overwhelming
majority (sixteen) clearly links stewardship to the creation of long311
For a criticism of the theory of universal owners, see Benjamin J.
Richardson & Maziar Peihani, Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Finance: A
Critique of a Premature Theory, 30 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 405 (2015).
312
For a detailed comparative and empirical analysis of these differences, see
Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, The Global Diffusion of Stewardship Codes
(Eur.
Corp.
Goverance
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
526,
2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3616798 [https://perma.cc/YYU9-MGXH].
313
See Katelouzou, supra note 6, at 582-87 (examining how eighteen
stewardship codes around the world view shareholder engagement).
314
For instance, the Japanese Stewardship Code tends to emphasize
shareholders’ interests rather than the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries and
wider stakeholders. On a detailed comparison between the UK and Japanese
Stewardship Codes, see Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of Stewardship Code: The Case
of Japan, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 365 (2018).
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term sustainable value for the investee companies. 315 Sixteen
stewardship codes specifically refer to environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) considerations thereby re-bundling “sustainable
and responsible investment” (SRI) 316 into shareholder
stewardship.317 This trend of advocating long-term and ESG-aware
investing through stewardship codes and principles is also
supported by the ICGN Global Stewardship Principles,318 and the
EFAMA Code,319 while the recently revised UK Code elevated social
and environmental factors, including climate change, to central
components of stewardship.320
In a similar vein, the SRD II is very much premised on the
acceptance that an active corporate governance role for institutions
will be aligned with the interests of their beneficiaries and the wider
stakeholders of their portfolio companies.321 Article 3(g) of the SRD
II requires institutional investors and asset managers to develop an
315
See ACSI 2018, supra note 288, at 5; CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, at 7;
CRISA, supra note 298, at 4, 7; DANISH CODE, supra note 282, at 3; DUTCH CODE, supra
note 284, at 1; FSC CODE, supra note 288, at 3; HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, at
1; ITALIAN CODE, supra note 283, at 16; JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 3; KENYA CODE,
supra note 294, at 2892; KOREA CODE, supra note 295, at 3; MALAYSIA CODE, supra note
296, at 4; SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297, at 3; SWISS CODE, supra note 286, at 4;
TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, at 2; and UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 1.
316
For more information on the meaning of SRI, see EUROSIF, EUROPEAN SRI
STUDY
2016,
at
9
(2016),
http://www.eurosif.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/SRI-study-2016-HR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB9R2XNZ].
317
See AMEC CODE, supra note 289, at 4; CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, at 7;
CRISA, supra note 298, at 4; DUTCH CODE, supra note 284, at 7; FSC CODE, supra note
288, at 10; HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, at 3; ITALIAN CODE, supra note 293, at
16; JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 2; KENYA CODE, supra note 294, at 2892; MALAYSIA
CODE, supra note 296, at 13; PFRDA, supra note 293, at 1; SEBI, supra note 293, at 3;
SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297, at 6; TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, at 8; THAILAND
CODE, supra note 299, at 37; UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 15. For information on
how stewardship codes around the world can support sustainability finance, see
Dionysia Katelouzou & Alice Klettner, Sustainable Finance and Stewardship:
Unlocking Stewardship’s Sustainability Potential (Eur. Corp. Goverance Inst., Working
Paper
No.
521,
2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578447
[https://perma.cc/L56G-NDWE].
318
See ICGN CODE, supra note 302, at 5, 11.
319
See EFAMA CODE, supra note 303, at 5.
320
See UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4, Principles 4, 7 (Environmental,
particularly climate change, and social factors, in addition to governance, have
become material issues for investors to consider when making investment decisions
and undertaking stewardship.”).
321 SRD II, supra note 52, at Recitals 14 & 15.
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engagement policy with the aim of improving both the financial and
non-financial performance of their investee companies, including
the reduction of social and environmental risks and compelling
institutional investors and asset managers to engage with
stakeholders (in particular employees) in developing a balanced,
long-term framework of corporate governance. 322 The directive,
therefore, reflects a broad-based public interest in making
institutional shareholders accountable for broader concerns in
respect of companies’ operations and to wider constituents in the
exercise of their engagement powers.323 Public disclosure imposed
on institutional investors and asset managers 324 also seems to
indicate the imposition of accountability on institutions beyond the
private contours of their investment management relationship with
their beneficiaries.
Overall, the development of stewardship codes and principles
bring a “public” coloration into a shareholder engagement, which is
essentially a “private” matter and can be seen as an effort, but
arguably an optimistic one, to realign the relationship between
ownership and control of public companies, which had become
increasingly divorced in the post-war decades and reinforced
corporate governance and investment management into society.325
For transnational corporate governance regulation, the rise and
expansion of stewardship codes reflect the significant change over
the past ten years concerning the question of output legitimacy:
more than ever are questions asked today that focus on who is
“affected” by institutional investors’ behavior and, by consequence,
by the promotion or the absence of relevant stewardship codes.
The expansion of the stewardship codes’ regulatory
prerogatives and directions further mirrors the transformation of its
associated constituencies. It is important to note in this respect that
SRD II, supra note 52.
On the public interests of the SRD II, see Iris H.-Y. Chiu & Dionysia
Katelouzou, From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time Ripe?, in
SHAREHOLDERS’ DUTIES 131 (Hanne S. Birkmose ed., 2017). This is part of a broader
and deepening connection between corporate regulation and the public. See
BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC (2019).
324 See Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of
long-term shareholder engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132/1) 3(g), 3(h), 3(i).
325
See Katelouzou, supra note 274.
322
323
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with regard to corporate governance’s “input legitimacy,”
numerous private and public actors have become direct intervenors
in the design of the stewardship codes and investors’ sustainability
compliance regimes.326 Increasingly, we witness a cross-fertilization
and a deterritorialized production of norms produced by various
private and public actors and the implications of such normproduction for the nature and enforcement of these codes.327 For
instance, as noted above, the UK Code evolved out of the 2010 Code
of the now dissolved ISC, which was set up at the behest of the Bank
of England in the 1970s as part of the Heath government’s attempts
to improve the relationships between institutional investors and
public companies.328 The members of the ISC were originally the
four major UK institutional investors’ associations, i.e. the National
Association of Pension Funds and the associations (then separate)
representing investment trusts, unit trusts, and insurers.329 In 1991,
the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (“ISC”) published a
statement on the “Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders”330
which set out non-binding, best practices for institutional investors
and agents in relation to their responsibilities in respect of their UK

326
For an analysis of the nature of the issuers of stewardship codes around
the world, see Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 312, and Hill, supra note 278.
327
For an approach in that direction, see Ruth Aguilera & Gregory Jackson,
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447 (2003).
328
See ALED DAVIES, THE CITY OF LONDON AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCE IN BRITAIN 1959-1979, at 42-52 (2017) (analyzing the
role of the Heath conservative government in developing effective relationships
between institutional investors and public companies).
329
See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 307, ¶ 2.2. “The Institutional
Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) is a forum of UK trade associations formed to allow
the UK institutional shareholding community to exchange views and, on occasion,
co-ordinate their activities in support of the interests of UK investors. It currently
[as of 2010] consists of the Association of British Insurers, the Association of
Investment Companies, the Investment Management Association and the National
Association of Pension Funds.” Id. It is noteworthy that the Investment
Management Association (IMA) was created in 2002 with the merger of the
previously separate Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds with the
Fund Managers’ Association. In 2014 IMA merged with the investment department
of the Association of British Insurers to create the Investment Association. For a
brief history of the Investment Association, see About Us, INV. ASS’N,
https://www.theia.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/Y6RX-4RB5].
330 Id. ¶ 2.3.
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investee companies.331 This statement was revised in 2002, 2004, and
2007 before being upgraded to its status as a Code in 2009 (revised
in 2010) that applied to institutional investors on a “comply-orexplain” basis. 332 The ISC’s principles were an attempt by the
institutional investors to self-regulate and thereby push back any
governmental intervention in respect of institutional shareholder
engagement, 333 especially following the Myners Review’s
recommendation in 2001 to impose a statutory duty on asset
managers “to intervene in companies—by voting or otherwise—
where there is a reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the
value of the investment.”334 UK policymakers had long regarded
institutional shareholder engagement as vital to the corporate
governance of public companies, but had deliberately sought
(especially since the 1990s) to induce institutional shareholders to
develop their own self-regulatory responses to public concerns
arising from the reluctance of institutional investors to take an active
stance in relation to corporate underperformance.335 Notably, the
Cadbury Report fully endorsed the ISC’s 1991 statement and called
on institutional investors to play a more active role in the corporate
governance of UK public companies.336 The Combined Code and
subsequent versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code (now
2018) invariably encouraged institutional investors to engage
constructively with the board of directors and to use their ownership
influence to pressure companies towards compliance with the

Id. ¶2.6.
Id. ¶¶ 2.4-2.7.
333 See id. ¶¶2.4-2.6.
334
PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A
REVIEW 14 (2001), http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.2001.-Institutional-Investment-in-the-United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6VJ-FB5N].
335
See,
e.g.,
CADBURY,
supra
note
219,
§
6.10,
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files//codes/documents/cadbury.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9EC-S45R] (“Given the weight of their votes, the way in which
institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of corporate
governance is of fundamental importance.”).
336
Id. §§ 4.59, 6.11, 6.12 & 6.16; see also Holland, supra note 236.
331
332

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

142

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

Code’s provisions,337 while the Myners Review338 and Higgs Review
both endorsed the ISC’s principles.339
The upgrade of the ISC’s principles to a soft Stewardship Code
introduced by the FRC in 2010340 is an example of “enforced selfregulation,”341 otherwise referred to as “meta-regulation,”342 and is
part of an emerging market-oriented governance landscape which is
closely associated with the long tradition of corporate governance
codes. The 2010 (and 2012) UK Code, like the UK Corporate
Governance Code, adopted the “comply or explain” approach, that
voluntary signatories to the Code should comply or else explain
why they do not comply with the Code’s seven principles.343 In a
significant break with the long tradition of “comply or explain” in
the area of corporate governance regulation, the 2020 UK Code
adopts the stricter apply and explain approach emphasizing
stewardship outcomes rather than policies. 344 Both approaches,
however, are investor-led based on what UK regulators envisage as
a “market for stewardship.”345 Stewardship signatories are expected
to provide good annual reporting on stewardship, while asset
owners are expected to monitor the stewardship activities of their
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 223, at 2.
MYNERS, supra note 334, § 5.73-5.94 (endorsing institutional shareholder
activism); HM TREASURY, UPDATING THE MYNERS PRINCIPLES: A CONSULTATION §
4.10-.11 (2008), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/consult_myner_310308.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBC9-4ELF].
339
DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORS
70
(2003),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121106105616/http://www.bis.g
ov.uk/files/file23012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DPH-FSHQ].
340
Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 307, ¶ 2.6.
341
See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate
Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1467 passim (1982) (outlining the concept of
“enforced self-regulation” and “its application in the context of corporate
accounting standards”).
342
Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, &
Martin Lodge eds., 2010).
343
UK CODE 2012 , supra note 281, at 4.
344
UK CODE 2020, supra note 281, at 4.
345
See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. & FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, BUILDING A
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE STEWARDSHIP 11-12 (2019) (defining
stewardship and discussing generally the market for stewardship),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp19-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RDR-ZHH4].
337
338

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/3

2020]

New Geographies of Corporate Governance

143

asset managers. This emerging “market for stewardship” in the UK
is supported by the facilitating role of the FRC’s tiering exercise,346
as well as the support provided by the Investor Forum347 and the
Investment Association’s Public Register and Long-term Reporting
Guidance. 348 At the same time, social enforcement (reputation)
mechanisms, such as public esteem or shaming carried out by
investors themselves,349 the media,350 and civil society groups, 351 are
becoming a key device for promoting stewardship and
sustainability, especially climate change. Correspondingly, the
enforcement of stewardship becomes an example of “dynamic
accountability” within what Michael Dorf, Charles Sabel, and
Jonathan Zeitlin call “experimentalist” governance where public
and private (market and social) actors work together to create
346
Tiering of Signatories to the Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Nov.
14, 2016), https://www.frc.org.uk/news/november-2016/tiering-of-signatoriesto-the-stewardship-code [https://perma.cc/93FA-EKQW].
347
The Investor Forum was established in 2014 following the 2012 Kay
Review to promote long-term shareholder engagement with UK companies. For
more information about the role and activities of the Investor Forum, see INV. F.,
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/5F6A-GA92].
348
The Investment Association introduced the public register to shareholder
dissent in December 2017 at the request of the UK Government. Also, following the
introduction of a new reporting requirement by the 2018 UK Corporate Governance
Code, for companies that see twenty percent or more of votes being cast against the
board recommendation for a resolution, the Investment Association published
guidance on long-term reporting.
For more information regarding the
requirements, see Public Register, INV. ASS’N, https://www.theia.org/publicregister [https://perma.cc/5LBB-KAEN].
349 See, e.g., Larry Fink’s Letter to CEOs, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance,
BLACKROCK
(2017),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/Z2MY-X8Z2]; Letter from
Ronald P. O’Hanley, CEO, State St. Glob. Advisors, to Bd. Members (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/20
17/Letter-and-ESG-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/34BW-MVX2].
For the
potential shaming capacity of regulators, see Andrew Pearce, FRC Threatens to
‘Shame’ Fund Managers Over Stewardship, FIN. NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:32 PM),
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/frc-threatens-to-shame-fund-managers-over
-stewardship-code-20151214 [https://perma.cc/U5AD-5QLR].
350
See, e.g., Michal Goldstein, Does Flight-Shaming Over Climate Change Pose
An Existential Threat to Airlines?, FORBES (June 4, 2019, 2:45 PM EDT),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2019/06/04/does-flight-shami
ng-over-climate-change-pose-an-existential-threat-to-airlines/#204458b83cfc
[https://perma.cc/86LS-CRZD].
351
See, e.g., CERES, https://www.ceres.org/ [https://perma.cc/H9UZARMR].
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regulatory arrangements and support enforcement. 352
This
accountability-through-peer-review has a more coercive effect for
all UK-authorized asset managers as it is backed by the FCA’s Code
of Conduct Handbook.353 This element of coerciveness of the UK
Code through the introduction of an associated disclosure
obligation on asset managers authorized by the FCA is broadly
equivalent in effect to the effect of the UK Listing Rules for public
companies, albeit different in scope and detail.
Similar to the UK Code, all the other national stewardship codes
are voluntary, “soft” law developments based on self-proclamation
and market enforcement, but the degree of their softness largely
depends on the issuing body. From the twenty-three total national
stewardship codes, twelve have been issued by regulators or quasiregulators and they all adopt a variant of the “comply or explain” or
“apply and explain” enforcement model.354 Yet from these, the UK,
Dutch, Indian (SEBI) and Japanese Codes are supported in their
function from an underpinning body of mandatory rules and/or
institutions as there is an obligation on the part of domestic investors
to comply or (apply and) explain.355 From the other eleven codes,
which have been issued by various industry participants or
investors themselves, six adopt the comply (apply) or explain

352
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan
Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance
in the EU, 14 EUR. L. J. 271 passim (2008).
353
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK, § 2.2.3,
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/COBS/2/2
[https://perma.cc/WFM5-M7FD].
354
DANISH CODE, supra note 282, HONG KONG CODE, supra note 292, PFRDA,
supra note 293, and SEBI, supra note 293, JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, KENYA CODE,
supra note 294, MALAYSIA CODE, supra note 296, SINGAPORE CODE, supra note 297,
TAIWAN CODE, supra note 300, THAILAND CODE, supra note 299, and the UK CODE
2020, supra note 281.
355 See, e.g., JAPAN CODE, supra note 291, at 6. It is expected that this coercive
element will be expanded in the EU following the transposition of the SRD II. For
a comprehensive analysis of the enforcement parameters of stewardship, see
Dionysia Katelouzou & Konstantinos Sergakis, Shareholder Stewardship Enforcement
(Eur.
Corp.
Goverance
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
514,
2020),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/katelouzose
rgakisfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR6C-NK2A].
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principle, 356 one has a mandatory element, 357 while the rest are
completely voluntary in nature.358
At the supranational level, Article 3(g) of the SRD II also adopts
the “comply or explain” approach.359 However, it has been argued
elsewhere that the SRD II is not far short of imposing a duty to
demonstrate engagement, as there is a duty on the part of asset
owners and asset managers to publicly disclose the implementation
and achievement of such engagement under Articles 3(h) and 3(i).360
Arguably, the disclosure-based regulation requires that certain
engagement conduct needs to be carried out in order for there to be
sufficient matters to report and moves away from treating
shareholder engagement as a voluntary practice, as is the case under
national stewardship codes. The SRD II, in a “capital market
regulation facet,” 361 is, therefore, a step towards legalizing or
juridifying shareholder engagement and stewardship as a response
to the social appetite for increasing regulation after the GFC.
Moreover, Article 14(b) enables—but not obliges—Member States to
provide for public enforcement of violations of the SRD II provisions
transposed into national law. 362 While only Italy and the
Netherlands have introduced such penalties for violations of
engagement and disclosure duties, the directive does not operate in
a normative vacuum since four Member States—Denmark, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the UK—have their own domestic soft-law
stewardship codes. These different approaches in enforcing
stewardship are reflective of the increasing poly-centricity of
stewardship norms and raise important questions about the future
356
ASCI 2018, supra note 288, ITALIAN CODE, supra note 283, DUTCH CODE,
supra note 284, CRISA, supra note 298, SWISS CODE, supra note 286, and KOREA CODE,
supra note 295.
357
ACSI 2018, supra note 288.
358
AMEC CODE, supra note 289, CANADIAN CODE, supra note 290, NORWEGIAN
CODE, supra note 285, and the United States, INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., STEWARDSHIP
FRAMEWORK
FOR
INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
(2017),
https://ecgi.global/code/stewardship-framework-institutional-investors-2017
[https://perma.cc/4G5Z-2D8H].
359
SRD II, supra note 52.
360
Chiu & Katelouzou, supra note 323.
361
For a critical approach, see Alessio M. Pacces, Shareholder Activism in the
CMU, in CAPITAL MARKETS UNION IN EUROPE 507, 523 (Danny Busch, Emilios
Avgouleas & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2018).
362
SRD II, supra note 52.
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symbiosis of soft and semi-hard law norms.363 Finally, in terms of
“output legitimacy,” while it is questionable whether “soft” law can
efficiently serve more paternalistic objectives, subjecting
institutional investment management to standards and scrutiny is
arguably a form of re-regulation, in order to ensure that the
privatized and financialized form of social welfare provision may
deliver public interest objectives in due course.
Our analysis shows that the development of the law of
shareholder stewardship over the last decade is a powerful example
of the complex intricacies between shareholder primacy and
broader stakeholder welfare as regulatory objectives, and between
internalized, self-regulatory processes of market-invoking
regulation and official law making at both domestic and
supranational levels. The development of stewardship codes also
confirms the inseparability of corporate governance regulation and
investment management regulation (and wider law-making reform)
when it comes to introducing standards of optimal institutional
shareholders’ behavior. Shareholder stewardship can also be seen
as an example of an increase in the national “policy space” in the
global economy.364 Following in the steps of the development of
corporate governance codes, the rapid diffusion of stewardship
principles through replication and adaptation is a powerful
illustration of how private ordering walks a fine line in relation to
the embedded, institutional frameworks for official law-making.
While some convergence towards universally acceptable
stewardship principles can arguably arise from the operation of
institutional investors, the stewardship codes themselves are
embedded in the complex emerging political economies of corporate
governance. The development of stewardship in countries with
various shareholder, legal, institutional, economic, and cultural
environments suggests that stewardship codes may have taken on a
different role—perhaps multiple different roles—than the original
“investor paradigm” underpinning the UK Code. Indeed, a few
examples suggest that this may be occurring in myriad ways, with
Katelouzou & Sergakis, supra note 355.
See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in Transnational
Governance: Emergent Pathways and Diffusion Mechanisms 7 (GR:EEN, Working Paper
No.
3,
2011),
http://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/WP%203_GREEN_Sabel%20and%2
0Zeitlin.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ3J-99RP].
363
364
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important implications for norm creation and law-making processes
yet to be explored. In South Africa, CRISA appears to prioritize
responsible investment and ESG factors over all other ownership
responsibilities.365 In Japan, the Code appears to be a policy tool
aimed at fulfilling a political and economic goal of reorienting
governance away from its traditional lifetime employee stakeholder
form of corporate governance. In effect, it is geared towards a more
shareholder focused form of governance to promote risk taking and
to improve returns on capital, while distinctly lacking, it seems, the
public interest orientation that we have identified in other codes.366
In Singapore, stewardship principles developed and promoted by a
government supported entity, Stewardship Asia, have set the rules
of the game for how institutional investors should engage with
listed companies—yet many of the most important listed companies
are themselves government controlled.367 In Europe, it is unlikely
that the SRD II will facilitate a convergence movement towards a
single, harmonized set of stewardship principles as it engages in
open competition with pre-existing domestic stewardship codes or
principles.368 At the same time, the ICGN Principles still have to
play the role of an international benchmark for good stewardship
similar to the global relevance of the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance.
At the end of this exemplary case study, we find that the
evolving law of shareholder stewardship can shine some light on the
new forms of transnational embeddedness of regulatory innovation
in locally defined governance structures on the one hand, and their
integration in spatially unfolding rule-making processes, on the
other. Regarding the relevant actors, norms, and processes, we find
a tension that has long been growing between private and state,
domestic and international actors, between shareholder primacy
CRISA, supra note 298, at 4.
Goto, supra note 314.
367
Puchniak & Tang, supra note 297 (arguing that the development of the
Singaporean Code serves the function of “halo signaling” demonstrating
commitment to global standards of good corporate governance).
368
See Dionysia Katelouzou & Konstantinos Sergakis, When Harmonisation is
not Enough: Shareholder Stewardship in the European Union, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (on file with author); see also Gen Goto, Alan K. Koh & Dan W.
Puchniak, Diversity of Shareholder Stewardship in Asia: Faux Convergence, 53 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 829 (2020) (arguing that the development of stewardship codes in
Asia leads to the phenomenon of “faux convergence”).
365
366
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and broader stakeholder welfare, and between market-invoking and
official-law making processes. Correspondingly, the development
of the law of shareholder stewardship is a powerful illustration of
the promise of a new methodology of transnational corporate
governance in offering the necessary tools and the required
analytical framework for understanding corporate governance
regulation in the 21st century.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICAL STAKES OF NORM CREATION
The development of stewardship codes and principles by
private and public actors to define institutional investors’ and asset
managers’ responsibilities is part of an emerging market-oriented
governance landscape which has seen a significant rise in corporate
governance codes and codes of conduct, a development which still
begs an important explanation of cause, agency and, certainly,
legitimacy. To simply attribute the expansion of private corporate
governance norm production to the “retreat” of the state or to
mounting public pressure on the state and on corporations to
embrace the idea of “corporate (social, environmental)
responsibility” and more recently “stakeholderism,” falls short of
fully capturing the regulatory dynamics which have been shaping
this field. But their very nature—their blended private and public
objectives, their oscillation between “hard” and “soft” law and
between state intervention and market ordering—has begun to
fundamentally alter the already demarcated regulatory landscape of
corporate governance and poses difficult questions, which are not
confined to the issues of regulatory governance in the area of
corporate regulation. Effectively, the attempt undertaken in this
Article to focus on the emerging plurality of political economies of
corporate governance as a transnational regulatory problem has
opened up perspectives on the bigger picture of which corporate
governance is but a part.
We used shareholder stewardship to illustrate the expansion
and, at the same time, the deepening of national and regional policy
spaces in a global economy. It is here where we came up with
unexpected results. The development of stewardship codes speaks
to the emergence of legal regimes that can no longer adequately be
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explained with reference to the “state” or the “market,” and is an
example of intricate, domestic, and transnational, multi-level
processes of norm generation involving different national,
supranational, and private actors, using non-traditional processes
through which norms are being generated, which do not wholly
comply with categories of statute, rule or treaty. We also found that
in times of perceived and increasingly critically scrutinized market
failures, the generation of “soft” law in the form of not always nonbinding norms is being outsourced, but not to the markets directly.
Instead, the task of coming up with a suitable regulatory regime is
uploaded and relegated to supranational actors. The SRD II is an
example of pursuing the harmonization of an area of law which had
for a long time been perceived as overly privatized and,
normatively, market focused. In the SRD II, the originally soft,
investor-driven law of shareholder stewardship appears to coalesce
into hard, regulatory law after arriving at a state of what Luhmann,
referred to as “counterfactually stabilised behavioural
expectations.”369 Given the continuously growing pressure of global
securities markets and their attendant rules on the normative
architecture of corporate law, a key question we need to ask is
whether we are indeed facing a re-bundling of “soft” law corporate
governance norms into “hard” law capital markets law.
A related question concerns the normative assessment of
emerging transnational corporate governance regimes such as the
stewardship one. The so-called and endlessly abused “public
interest” might function as a reference point when calling private
investment management of financialized social wealth to account.
But, more likely is the re-characterization of any future stewardship
legalization as a form of regulatory accountability framework which
goes beyond the traditional, law and economics approach to the
corporate governance role of institutional shareholders to a broader
“regulatory ecology” serving both private and public interests.370
369 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 33 (Martin Albrow
ed., Elizabeth King-Utz & Martin Albrow trans., 2d ed. 2014) (“Norms are
counterfactually stabilized behavioral expectations. Their meaning implies
unconditional validity, in so far as the validity of the norm is experienced, and thus
institutionalized, as independent of actual fulfilment or non-fulfilment.”).
370 See Beate Sjåfjell & Mark B. Taylor, Clash of Norms: Shareholder Primacy vs.
Sustainable Corporate Purpose, 13 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 40 passim (2019)
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There is also the issue of the chosen enforcement mode. Unlike
the tradition of market-invoking regulation in the area of corporate
governance which is based very much on the premise of enabling,
private and market-driven regulatory modes, the development of
shareholder stewardship serves more paternalistic objectives of
aligning institutional investors’ corporate governance role with
long-term corporate wealth creation as a social good. But if this is
the purported regulatory aim behind the development of
shareholder stewardship, the adoption of soft “comply or explain”
or “apply and explain” enforcement approaches seems out of step.
While market discipline has long served as the default enforcement
mode in corporate governance regulation and has been extensively
examined within the context of corporate governance codes,
allowing asset owners and other market participants to be the only
monitors of the veracity of both the signatory statements and the
actual outcomes of stewardship is not only of questionable
effectiveness but is also out of step with the stated “public”
regulatory objectives.371
It is therefore necessary to ask whether this infused paternalism
and the gradual hardening of the shareholder stewardship norms in
the SRD II is but a superficial change or whether, instead, we should
welcome it as an opportunity to place the institutional investors and
the corporation more broadly in a post “embedded liberalism”
context.
From the perspective of transnational corporate
governance, the development of stewardship codes shows how the
tradition of “market-focused” corporate governance regulation can
and should no longer rely on the path-dependent trajectories of
national law-making processes. The emergence of transnational
corporate governance is characterized by an intricate combination
of public and private agency, but also of a variety of evolving
regulatory instruments where “hard” law is not stable. In that sense,
domestic corporate governance reform must be seen as part of an
(examining the interaction of corporate regulation with the social norms of
shareholder primacy and sustainability and the development of a regulatory
ecology of corporate purpose).
371 See Iris H.-Y. Chiu & Dionysia Katelouzou, Making a Case for Regulating
Institutional Shareholders' Corporate Governance Roles, 2018 J. Bus. L. 67 passim
(examining the inadequacies of the UK regulatory regime to address the public
interests of investor-led governance and stewardship and proposing ways to
address this via mandatory securities and investment management regulation).
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emerging transnational legal pluralism, which is shaped by
continuing normative legacies as well as institutional and
processual path-dependencies of particular local political
economies.
But, at the same time, the legal pluralism of
transnational corporate governance reveals itself in the co-existence,
interpenetration, and interaction of different regulatory forms.
Seen in this light, the case of shareholder stewardship is
illustrative of how “soft” law recommendations can enter a
regulatory realm which is occupied by both public and private
norm-entrepreneurs. While the former includes “the state,” which
pursues corporate law reform, the latter encompasses a wide range
of private actors such as banks, investments funds, and expert
groups who are calling for new rules to govern investment conduct.
But it also includes other stakeholders such as unions and labor
activists as well as civil society groups uniting and campaigning
under different flags and themes.
From this perspective,
shareholder stewardship denotes how “soft” law recommendations
may grow into widely accepted norms of “good governance” and
solidify perceived public interest. Shareholder stewardship is not
the only case where we can draw out complex correlations between
different actors, levels, and spaces of norm creation or where we can
trace the infusion of public stakeholder objectives into shareholder
welfare. The well-examined examples of the development of
corporate governance codes and corporate codes of conduct already
show the “law’s poly-contextualization.” 372 As for the newly
amplified public interest in transnational corporate governance
regulation, this traceable trend can be, for example, found in postGFC corporate governance regulations in the UK and elsewhere
where efforts are underway that aim to solidify public policies, such
as wealth distribution, equality in the boardrooms and labor force,
and various social goals, including long-term enterprise
sustainability, wider stakeholder welfare, the protection of the
environment, or gender and racial equality in economic
organizations. Such policies are concerned with the objectives and
outcomes of corporate activity within the wider fabric of the
economy and society and go well beyond law and economics
perceptions of the corporation and its perceived purpose, effectively
feeding into the changing policies of transnational corporate
372

CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 210.
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governance regulation in globally integrated, yet locally distinct
market and regulatory places.
The analysis offered in this Article should be seen as woven into
the broader transformative trends in transnational law, global law,
and legal pluralism. It seeks to cut through the distinct layers of
comparative company law and institutional analysis to shed a new
light on the far-reaching reform processes in domestic corporate
governance systems worldwide but also on the proliferation of fora
where, through new (and old) actors and in reliance on and through
the development of new processes of participation, drafting,
dissemination, and implementation, new norms are being created.
Transnational corporate governance is here rendered as a
methodological laboratory to inquire into emerging forms of
authority and legitimacy, scrutinizing competing claims of
effectiveness and testing the “real world” impact that emerging
regulatory forms have on a wider set of stakeholders and “affected”
populations. These new actors are directly engaged in negotiating
competing interests regarding the economic—but also the larger
social—function of the firm, as they all operate in intertwined local
and global contexts. 373 They make competing claims regarding
participation and control while being equally concerned with
accountability, long-term orientation, and the protection of a wide
range of local and distant interests.374 It comes as no surprise then
that the scope of corporate governance regulation—whether it is the
state or particular market actors who are taking the lead—continues
to expand significantly. Concerns around environmental, social and
economic sustainability, risk and reputation, equality and minority
protection have become part of the field’s “common lexicon,” 375
while technological advances have an impact not only on the way

373 See, e.g., David Monciardini, The ‘Coalition of the Unlikely’ Driving the EU
Regulatory Process of Non-Financial Reporting, 36 SOC. & ENV’T ACCOUNTABILITY J. 76
(2016).
374
Zumbansen, supra note 243, at 1469-98; see also Shaffer, supra note, 41 at 24956.
375 See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk,
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020),
VAND.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441375
[https://perma.cc/5QT9-LWT2].
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both boardrooms and shareholder operate,376 but also, with regard
to artificial intelligence’s fundamental transformation of financial
markets operation.377 In that vein, a critical project of transnational
corporate governance promises an inclusive and transformative
reconceptualization of the corporation and its key actors and
constituents in a world, which is marked by a growing
disillusionment among the marginalized, excluded, and most
vulnerable populations.

376 See, e.g., Florian Möslein, Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and
Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649
(Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds. 2018); Anne Lafarre & Christoph Van der
Elst, Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism, (Eur.
Corp.
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Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
390,
2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135209 [https://perma.cc/8PTP-FJ96].
377
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